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The American Fiscal Constitution*
Kenneth W. Damt
The United States Constitution contains relatively few
provisions explicitly concerned with the authority of the federal
government and the states to tax and spend. Nevertheless, an
impressive structure of rules has evolved governing the division
of fiscal powers and responsibilities within our federal system.
These rules include Supreme Court decisions interpreting the
Constitution, key framework legislation, and implicit under-
standings derived from existing practice. Professor Dam con-
structs a general outline of the resulting American Fiscal Con-
stitution, and provides a contrasting view of the West German
fiscal constitution. He also offers some tentative conclusions
about how federal grants-in-aid and revenue sharing have af-
fected the distribution of fiscal benefits and burdens within our
system.
The notion of an American Fiscal Constitution may strike most
American constitutional lawyers as odd. The Constitution has little
to say about taxation and expenditures, and what it does say is
neither detailed nor comprehensive. The Framers were content to
* An earlier version of this paper was delivered in July, 1976, at a conference in Bonn,
West Germany, sponsored by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft on the occasion of the
United States Bicentenary. A number of the author's colleagues read various versions of the
manuscript, and he would like especially to thank Gerhard Casper, Walter Hellerstein, Ed-
mund Kitch, William M. Landes, and Phil C. Neal for their comments and suggestions. He
would also like to thank Robert Sherwin, a second year student at the University of Chicago
Law School, for assisting with the statistical work in Part m.
t Harold J. and Marion F. Green Professor of International Legal Studies, The Univer-
sity of Chicago.
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deal with a few key issues rather than specify the respective fiscal
powers and responsibilities of the federal government and the
states. In the License Tax Case' of 1866 Chief Justice Chase was
able to summarize the constitutional rules on the federal taxing
power rather adequately in a few sentences:
[T]he power of Congress to tax is a very extensive power. It is
given in the Constitution, with only one exception and only two
qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it must im-
pose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect
taxes by the rule of uniformity. Thus limited, and thus only,
it reaches every subject, and may be exercised at discretion.2
The constitutional provisions on federal expenditures and on
state taxing and spending are even sparser. Yet when one contem-
plates the Constitution as a whole, considering provisions not specif-
ically directed to fiscal matters and taking into account the federal
structure created by the Constitution, an imposing edifice of powers
and limitations can be perceived. The result is what I shall call the
Fiscal Constitution. By that I mean the sum of the constitutional
provisions bearing on taxation and expenditure, including both
rules defining the fiscal competence of the branches of the federal
government and rules allocating taxing and spending powers be-
tween the federal government and the states.
Supplementing the rules of taxation and expenditure found in
the Constitution are several statutes that are so far-reaching in their
implications for year-by-year fiscal decisions that they deserve to be
thought of as quasi-constitutional. The most important are the
Budget and Accounting Act of 19211 and the Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.1 Another statute that may
become as historically important is the State and Local Fiscal Assis-
tance Act of 1972,5 which inaugurated the general revenue sharing
program. American constitutional law does not have a separate cat-
egory to describe these "framework" statutes, though they are in-
creasing in importance.' Although such statutes can be amended
72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462 (1866).
Id. at 471.
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20 (codified in scattered sections
of 31 U.S.C.).
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88
Stat. 298 (codified in scattered sections of 1, 2, 31 U.S.C.).
5 State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-512, 86 Stat. 919 (codified
in scattered sections of 26, 31 U.S.C.).
I Consider also the War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (Supp. V
1975). See Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign and Defense Policy:
A Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 463, 481-82 (1976).
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under the same congressional majority rule as any other statute and
must comply with the Constitution, it would be a triumph of form
over substance to treat them as ordinary legislation.
When we turn from the formal Fiscal Constitution to fiscal
practice, we find that the actual pattern of federal and state taxes
and expenditures at any one time reflects some rather clear princi-
ples. The federation and the states specialize, each selecting certain
taxes and certain subjects of expenditure. There are, to be sure,
overlaps on both the taxing and spending sides, and the degree of
specialization and the scope of the overlaps change over time. But
these changes are slow, well-known, and seldom reversed. As we
look back over time, the changes seem motivated much less by
partisan political differences than by the gradually changing role of
government in society. In short, fiscal realities reveal a clearer inter-
governmental fiscal structure than does the Constitution itself.
Moreover, although the federal Constitution is not concerned with
the devolution of state power to local governments, an analogous
pattern of specialization in taxing and spending is to be found be-
tween state and local governments, again with gradual changes over
time.
This stable yet evolving structure reflects a widespread consen-
sus in American society about the respective roles of the federal,
state, and local governments. When there is political controversy
over federal and state responsibilities it tends to be limited to one
or two items on the public agenda, such as the debate today over
the financing of welfare. Usually, when a new issue arises with re-
spect to the scope of governmental activity the locus of responsibil-
ity between state and nation is not in doubt. Even the recent finan-
cial crisis of New York City, which some observers perceived as a
crisis of fiscal federalism, brought forth only a minor financing inno-
vation in the form of a three-year "seasonal" loan from the federal
government to the municipality, with full repayment required at the
end of each fiscal year.7 Although the independence of New York
City within the New York state system of government has been
reduced, no change in the allocation of either taxing or spending
responsibilities between federal and state government has as yet
emerged.
With the thought that this evolving structure is at least as
New York City Seasonal Financing Act of 1975, 31 U.S.C. § § 1501-1510 (Supp. V 1975).
Federal loans to states and local governments are common, and some are made on a revolving
basis. See OFnCE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, SPECI.L ANALYsES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FiscAL YEAR 1978, at 288-89 (Table 0-10) (1977) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL
ANALYsEs 1978].
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important as the provisions of the Constitution, and perhaps can be
described as the constitution (with a lower-case "c") underlying the
process of public choice, I shall describe this structure in some detail
in Part III. But before doing so, I shall set forth in Part I an overview
of the provisions of the formal Constitution and the Supreme
Court's interpretations of them. Throughout the article, and in
somewhat greater detail in Part II, I shall contrast the American
Fiscal Constitution with that of another economically advanced
constitutional federation-the Federal Republic of Germany.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The Constitution was drafted in an era when the fiscal responsi-
bilities of governments were very different from today. In 1787 the
fiscal problem was not so much to raise and spend large sums of
money efficiently as to secure a modest source of revenue to finance
limited governmental operations. It was also a Constitution for a
new nation, to be formed out of states that already had their own
tax systems and their own protectionist tariffs. Thus, one of the
principal fiscal objectives of the Constitution was to ensure that
state tax and tariff policies did not impede the creation of a free
trade area among the states or permit some states to profit at the
expense of others.
In light of today's vastly changed fiscal conditions, the adapta-
bility of the Fiscal Constitution is truly remarkable. Because the
American Constitution is comparatively difficult to amend,' it is
fortunate that the Framers included only what they considered the
minimum conditions for achieving their limited fiscal objectives.
The modesty and lack of specificity of the Fiscal Constitution prob-
ably account for its durability. The lacunae in the written Constitu-
tion have been filled by Supreme Court interpretations and by stat-
utes, which can be changed when conditions change. As a result, the
fiscal provisions of the Constitution have been amended only once,
and that amendment-the sixteenth-is generally considered today
to have been the result more of a mistaken Supreme Court decision
than of any defect in the Constitution itself.
I See U.S. CONST. art. V. Probably the most important barrier to amending the Constitu-
tion is that it cannot be amended by Congress alone, however great the majority voting for
the amendment may be. In this respect the American Constitution differs from most modem
constitutions. In the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, the Basic Law can be
amended by the affirmative vote of a two-thirds majority in both the Bundestag, the popular
house, and the Bundesrat, an upper house composed of representatives of the Lander(states).
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 79(2).
1 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, vacating on rehearing 157 U.S.
429 (1895), discussed in text at note 82 infra.
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A. The Role of State and Nation
In considering the formal structure created by the Constitution,
one must bear in mind the role of the states in both constitutional
theory and current political reality. From the standpoint of consti-
tutional theory, the American states are considered to exist, in an
abstract sense, prior to the federation. Though it was "We the Peo-
ple of the United States" who did "ordain and establish this Consti-
tution for the United States of America,"10 the legislative powers of
the federation are not plenary but limited to those delegated to it
in the Constitution. Should anyone miss the point, the tenth
amendment to the Constitution declares that "[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.""
The legislative competence of the states thus exists indepen-
dently of the Constitution. The states are entitled to legislate with
respect to any subject whatsoever, except as they are specifically
prohibited from doing so by the Constitution or as federal legislation
is held as a result of the Supremacy Clause to render state legisla-
tion inapplicable. 2 Here and there in the Constitution we do find
specific prohibitions, either because retention of a particular power
by the states was thought by the Framers to be incompatible with
a federal system (as in the case of the prohibition against state
treaties with foreign powers)'3 or because the Constitution imposes
a restriction as part of its guarantees of individual liberty (as in the
case of the prohibition against deprivation of "life, liberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law")." A third possibility is that the
delegation of a power to the federal government may be taken by
implication to withdraw that power from the states. For example,
the delegation to the Congress of power to "regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States"'" has been inter-
,U.S. CONST. preamble.
James Madison, in presenting the first ten amendments to the Constitution to the
House of Representatives, noted that several of the state ratifying conventions had been
"particularly anxious that it should be declared in the Constitution that the powers not
therein delegated should be reserved to the States." 1 ANNALs OF CONG. 458. Although Madi-
son suggested that the proposed tenth amendment was "superfluous" and "unnecessary"
since "the whole of the instrument" implied the principle it established, he believed that
"there can be no harm in making such a declaration." Id. at 459.
"2 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
'3 Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
" Id. amend. XIV.
15 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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preted to deny by implication the power of the states to regulate
foreign and interstate commerce in certain circumstances."
The constitutional theory and political reality of federal-state
relations have diverged. The general view in the United States,
perhaps especially among academics, is that the federal govern-
ment, far from acting as a government of limited powers, is in politi-
cal fact a government of comprehensive powers, and that the states
have been left to do what the federal government chooses not to do.
Though the change in the role of the national and state governments
has been great in this century, the dimensions of the change disguise
the extent to which the American government remains genuinely
federal in nature. However one looks at the American states, they
retain an independence and vitality that is all the more remarkable
when compared with the role of the constituent units of other federal
nations.
In comparison with the Ldnder (states) of the Federal Republic
of Germany, for example, the powers reserved to the American
states are considerable. In Germany the great bulk of private law is
federal, as can be seen by glancing at the German Federal Civil
Code, which sets forth in successive chapters the law of obligations
(contracts, torts, and restitution), property, family law, and dece-
dents' estates.'7 Other federal statutes govern criminal law, corpora-
tions, commercial law, and insurance. 18 The American states, in
contrast, are responsible for most of the law in all of these fields.
And although American writers like to emphasize the growing dis-
placement of state law by federal statutory regulation, state statu-
tory regulation of business probably remains more significant in
terms of actual economic impact than does federal regulation."
Like the German Lander, the states have large bureaucracies.
In 1973 about one-eighth of the entire U.S. work force (that is, over
9 million people) was employed by state and local governments."0
11 See Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Cooley v. Board of Wardens,
53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
,' BGB [Burgerliches Gesetzbuch] §§ 241-853 (law of obligations); Id. §§ 854-1296
(property law); Id. §§ 1297-1921 (family law); Id. §§ 1922-2385 (decedents' estates).
Is The Strafgesetzbuch is the general criminal code of West Germany. The
Handelsgesetzbuch governs much of what Americans call commercial law and contains the
basic law of associations and corporations, although there are additional statutes in both
areas. The Versicherungs-Vertragsgesetz governs insurance contracts.
" Readers who are surprised by this conclusion should consider, among other factors, the
vast amount of licensing of occupations and businesses at the state and local level, see
generally Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 6, 10-18 (1976),
and the profound economic importance of local land use regulation.
0 ADVIsoRY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATiONS, SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF FIscAL
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Unlike the German Ldnder, however, which are responsible for
administering most federal legislation," American state bureaucra-
cies administer primarily their own statutory law. Situations in
which the states administer federal statutory law, such as the Food
Stamp Program, 22 are the exception. The U.S. federal government
finances many state programs through conditional grants-in-aid,
and thus in practice may dictate the content of those state pro-
grams, but this is a topic to which I shall return later.2 Since most
federal programs must be administered by the federal government
rather than the states, the federal bureaucracy is also large. Over
2,800,000 people work for the executive branch of the federal govern-
ment (not including another 2,100,000 in the military services).
The existence of local governments in the United States, again
in contrast to Germany, is in no way guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion.25 They owe their competence and whatever self-rule they enjoy
to state constitutions. Consequently, the division of state taxing
and spending powers between state and local governments is a ques-
tion of state law.
B. The Separation of Powers
If we look more closely at the federal government, other impor-
tant features of the American Fiscal Constitution can be seen. Presi-
dential, as opposed to parliamentary, government places an empha-
sis on the separation of powers or, perhaps the better phrase,
"checks and balances" between the executive and the legislature.Y
The consequence in the United States has been the creation of a set
of procedural and jurisdictional principles concerning the manner in
which powers concededly vested in the national government as a
whole are exercised.
FEDERALISM: TRENDS 31 (Table XXII) (1976) [hereinafter cited as TRENDS]. Just over one-
half of these employees are in the public education sector.
2, GG arts. 83-85; see Kauper, The Constitutions of West Germany and the United
States: A Comparative Study, 58 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1150-52 (1960).
- 7 U.S.C. §§ 2019, 2024 (1970).
2 See text and notes at notes 163-74 infra.
21 SpEC L ANALYSES 1978, supra note 7, at 164 (Table H-2). These figures do not include
the legislative and judicial branches.
15 The German Basic Law expressly guarantees the right of municipalities (Gemeinden)
to self-government. GG art. 28(2). At the same time, it must be recognized that American
cities probably have more autonomy in fact than do German municipalities.
28 See generally J. FoRDHAm, LOCAL GoVERN ENT LAw 48-107 (rev. ed. 1975). More than
thirty-five states have some form of constitutional home rule for municipalities, while some
seventeen afford home rule for counties. Id. at 73 nn.1 & 2.
See Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign and Defense Policy:
A Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 463, 484 (1976).
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The "power of the purse" lies in the Congress as a result of the
provision that "[n]o money shall be drawn from the Treasury but
in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law."2 The funds that
oil the machinery of the executive branch are thus made available
through the same constitutional procedure followed in enacting
other statutes. Appropriations bills, like other legislation, must be
presented to the President for his approval or veto, with the possibil-
ity of an override of any veto by the votes of two-thirds of both
Houses of Congress. 29
Congress has enacted two major pieces of budgetary legislation
that are of such importance they deserve to be considered part of
the Fiscal Constitution in its larger sense. The first, enacted in 1921,
governs the executive part of the budget cycle; the second, enacted
in 1974, governs the legislative part. The Budget and Accounting
Act of 192110 establishes the framework within which the annual
budget cycle unfolds. The essence of the Act is that the President
is to propose to Congress each January a consolidated budget pro-
posal. This "President's Budget" lays out in massive detail the
President's financial plan for the ensuing fiscal year.31 The Act was
designed to substitute central presidential planning for the prior
practice whereby individual departments and agencies, or even sub-
ordinate bureaus, submitted their appropriation requests directly to
the Congress.2 Although the President in his Budget merely pro-
poses and the Congress by action or inaction disposes, the Presi-
dent's Budget tends to set the framework for the ensuing congres-
sional and public debate, especially when a President is willing to
use his political capital and his constitutional veto power in support
of his Budget.
As the range of governmental activities has expanded in recent
decades, the annual executive branch budget cycle supervised by
' U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. This clause further requires that "a regular Statement
and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from
time to time." Id.
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20 (codified in scattered sections
of 31 U.S.C.).
" Until calendar year 1976 (fiscal year 1977) the fiscal year ran from July 1 to June 30;
fiscal years now begin on October 1. 31 U.S.C. § 1020 (Supp. V 1975).
31 For a description of the budgetary process prior to 1921, see U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N
ON ECONOMY AND EFFcmCY, THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL BUDGET, H.R. Doc. No. 854, 62d
Cong., 2d Sess. 13-128 (1912).
1 Prior to 1939 the Bureau of the Budget was located in the Treasury Department,
although even then it reported directly to the President. In 1970 the Bureau of the Budget
became the present-day Office of Management and Budget. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of
1970, 31 U.S.C. § 16 (1970).
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the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has become more and
more a planning and policy-making process. The budget cycle is
typically a bruising bureaucratic and political struggle in which a
multitude of executive branch agencies strive to increase their share
of the budgetary pie while the OMB attempts to fit proposed outlays
within a presidentially-set spending target. When agreement be-
tween an agency and the OMB is not possible, the President must
decide. Those decisions are in no sense cabinet decisions, as would
be the case in many other governments. Nor is the Secretary of the
Treasury as important in the process as are finance ministers in
other countries. It is characteristic of the U.S. presidential system
that the budgetary responsibility is vested in an agency within the
Executive Office of the President (that is, the OMB) rather than in
a ministry of finance, as in nearly all other countries. 3 Thus, the
Secretary of the Treasury plays a role not greatly different from any
other cabinet member, except insofar as the Treasury is able, as the
taxing department, to advise the President on the revenue side of
the revenue-expenditure ledger.
The second major piece of budgetarV legislation-the 1974 Con-
gressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act-cannot be un-
derstood without some appreciation of the traditional distinction
between the authorization and the appropriation of expenditures.
Traditionally, an authorization bill, which is also subject to a presi-
dential veto, precedes the passage of an appropriations bill. In ef-
fect, an appropriation has to pass muster twice in both Houses, once
before a legislative "authorizing" committee and once before an
appropriations committee. There was a time when the House and
Senate Appropriations Committees were able to pass on the annual
budget as a whole. A growing trend, however, has been the develop-
ment of "backdoor spending" techniques in which the appropria-
tions process is short-circuited by forms of authorization that effec-
tively remove any discretion in either the Congress or the President
to refuse to consent to the appropriation.34 These legislative tech-
niques involve such esoteric fiscal devices as trust funds, contract
authority, and entitlements.3 5 Some such devices exclude the Ap-
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
34 See JoINT STUDY COMM. ON BUDGET CONTROL, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING CON-
GRESSIONAL CONTROL OVER BUDGETARY OUTLAY AND RECEIPTS TOTALS, H.R. REP. No. 147, 93d
Cong. 1st Sess. 10-12 (1973). See generally HOUSE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 95TH CONG., 1ST
SESs., CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF EXPENDrruRsS (Comm. Print 1977).
ITrust funds do not usually involve a trust in the private law sense but simply a
statutory earmarking of particular receipts for outlays in a related area, with any surplus of
receipts over outlays invested in U.S. Treasury securities. Contract authority permits govern-
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propriations Committees entirely from the process. Others present
the Appropriations Committees with the alternative of appropriat-
ing funds or forcing the federal government to default on its obliga-
tions. Regardless of the device used, appropriations committees are
divested of any role in determining the level of public spending.'
The growth of backdoor spending techniques cannot be attrib-
uted to a desire to circumvent the President's veto power. Backdoor
spending does not in theory limit the veto power of the President
because the President may veto the original authorizing legislation
(although any particular President of course may find that the legis-
lation was enacted during the tenure of one of his predecessors).
Instead, the prime stimulus for the development of most backdoor
spending techniques has been the aspiration of specialized legisla-
tive committees of Congress, many of whom adopt an advocacy
posture toward the programs they review, to bypass the fiscally
more conservative and legislatively less specialized Appropriations
Committees.
Backdoor spending, which now accounts for close to one-half of
any year's federal outlays, has increasingly converted the presiden-
tial budgetary function from one of proposing to Congress how tax
and borrowing revenues should be spent to one of estimating ex-
penditures already effectively committed under prior years' legisla-
tion. Today the combination of backdoor spending techniques and
the momentum of prior years' appropriations dictates the content
of roughly three-quarters of each year's expenditures." These so-
called uncontrollable outlays38 will be made unless legislation is
ment agencies to enter into construction or procurement contracts, with the Appropriations
Committee relegated to the clerical function of paying the obligations when they become due.
Entitlement programs create rights in individual citizens, for example to food stamps or
welfare payments, with the result that Congress has no option but to appropriate funds to
meet those obligations.
m Other phenomena that arguably constitute a form of backdoor spending are so-called
tax expenditures-the subsidization of specific types of activity through the allowance of
income tax deductions or credits for expenses related to that activity. See generally S. SUR-
REY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITuRES (1973), reviewed in Blum,
Book Review, 1 J. CORP. TAX. 486 (1975). Congress took a small step toward regulating tax
expenditures in the Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 by requiring the President to
prepare an annual "tax expenditure budget" for submission to Congress. 31 U.S.C. § 11
(Supp. V 1975).
' OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT Am BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FIS-
CAL YEAR 1978, at 420-21 (Table 16) (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1978 BUDGET].
Is Uncontrollability is a technical concept. Much of the remaining one-quarter of the
budget may not be controllable as a political matter. For example, most of the Defense
Department budget is technically controllable because manpower costs constitute over half
of the defense budget, but that does not mean that Congress could be expected to reduce
defense budget outlays sharply in any particular year.
[44:271
American Fiscal Constitution
enacted to stop them. In practice, therefore, the escalating use of
backdoor spending techniques has effectively reversed the textbook
notion that Congress through the legislative process affirmatively
decides upon the amount and content of each year's expenditures.
The budget portion of the 1974 Congressional Budget and Im-
poundment Control Act39 bears an interesting parallel to the 1921
Budget and Accounting Act. Whereas the 1921 Act was designed to
permit the executive branch to function as a unit in budgetary
matters, the 1974 Act is designed to do the same for the Congress.
After the President's Budget is submitted in January for the ensuing
fiscal year (to commence on October 1), the Congress is required to
pass a concurrent resolution by May 15 establishing a recommended
level of budgetary authority and outlays, both for the government
as a whole and for each major functional category of spending. The
normal appropriations process then proceeds, but by September 15
the Congress must pass a second concurrent resolution, either modi-
fying its earlier resolution to reflect the results of the appropriations
process or making recommendations for changes in appropriations
or taxation to reconcile them with the overall totals in the second
resolution. 0 Perhaps more important than this statutory proce-
dure-which cannot by its own force ensure budgetary control or the
adherence of the Congress to its own procedures and deadlines-is
the creation of a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and Budget
Committees in both houses. The CBO is expected to develop the
kind of expertise that has made the OMB professional staff so im-
portant and effective in the executive branch budget process, and
the Budget Committees will provide a counterweight to other con-
gressional committees that are more interested in individual pro-
grams than overall fiscal policy. Although the mechanisms of the
1974 Act are shot through with exceptions designed to protect some
of the same programs that had been the beneficiaries of backdoor
spending techniques," the first results under the statute have been
gratifying to proponents of fiscal responsibility.
31 31 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1353 (Supp. V 1975).
10 The procedures prescribed by the new Act are set forth at 31 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1353
(Supp. V 1975).
' 2 U.S.C. §§ 601-604 (Supp. V 1975).
42 Social Security, highway, and most other trust funds as well as general revenue sharing
are exempt. 31 U.S.C. § 1351(d) (Supp. V 1975). Moreover, if a program has been sheltered
from the current year's budget process by past years' authorizing legislation, an improved
budget process can do little more than to estimate (as opposed to prescribe) the amount of
spending on that program. Hence, although new entitlement programs are subject to the
congressional budget process, see 31 U.S.C. § 1351(b) (Supp. V 1975), an increase in esti-
1977]
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The impoundment control portion of the 1974 Act 43 was de-
signed to resolve a steadily growing political and constitutional issue
concerning the President's duty to spend appropriated funds. Al-
though Presidents had long refused to spend certain appropriated
funds pursuant to narrowly circumscribed authority under various
statutes, 4 the assertion by President Nixon of a constitutional right
to refuse to spend appropriated funds, 5 coupled with a broader
presidential view of the relevant statutory authorities, led to the
impoundment control provisions in the 1974 Act.46 The Act requires
the President to report all proposals to reserve appropriated funds
(broadly called "impoundments") to the Congress. Proposals to
defer expenditures are effective under the statute unless either
House disapproves. Proposals to rescind, as opposed to defer, be-
come effective only on approval of both Houses. Unfortunately, a
President's deferral may be viewed by a legislator as a rescission, a
circumstance suggesting that the 1974 Act has not completely elimi-
nated the impoundment issue from potential separation-of-powers
controversies.
C. Limitations on State Taxation
The Constitution places a number of constraints on state taxa-
tion. Most of these constraints are intended to prevent states from
mated spending under existing entitlement programs tends to result in larger overall congres-
sional budget totals unless the decision is taken to cut other more controllable programs. See
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, GUIDE TO THE CONGRESS 132-33 (2d ed. 1976).
- 31 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1407 (Supp. V 1975).
"4 These statutes are collected in Statement of Information, Hearings Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary to Investigate whether Sufficient Grounds Exist to Impeach Richard
M. Nixon, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Book XII, 57-75 (1974).
" See Impoundment of Appropriated Funds by the President: Joint Hearings on S. 373
Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Impoundment of Funds of the Senate Comm. on Govern-
ment Operations and the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 364 (1973) (statement of Joseph T. Sneed, Deputy Atty. Gen.).
41 Recent court decisions have also been on the whole hostile to presidential impound-
ments. As a matter of statutory construction courts have been reluctant to find that Congress
intended to confer discretion upon the executive branch to withhold appropriated funds. See,
e.g., Kennedy v. Mathews, 413 F. Supp. 1240, 1245 (D.D.C. 1976); see also Train v. City of
New York, 420 US. 35 (1975). Lower court decisions have also developed a distinction between
impoundments for program-related reasons and impoundments for collateral reasons, uni-
formly invalidating the latter. See State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir.
1973); Dubose v. Hills, 405 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Conn. 1975); City of Los Angeles v. Coleman,
397 F. Supp. 547 (D.D.C. 1975) (collecting cases). Occasionally courts have also applied this
distinction to sustain discretionary impoundments. See Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 501 F.2d 848
(D.C. Cir. 1974). The contention that the President has inherent constitutional authority to
impound funds has been almost uniformly rejected. See Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. Brinegar,
388 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1975) (collecting cases); Guadamuz v. Ash, 368 F. Supp. 1233
(D.D.C. 1973).
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using their taxing powers to raise revenue on activities or persons
outside the state (sometimes called "tax exporting") or from using
taxes to protect local economic interests from out-of-state competi-
tion. The former limit corresponds to a territorial conception of state
jurisdiction and ensures that state taxation is confined within a
state's borders. The latter limit derives from the proposition that
the Constitution was intended to create a free trade area and that
it is not permissible for the American states to engage in the kind
of economic protectionism so commonly practiced by nation-states
in the international community. Both of these limits have been
derived by the Supreme Court from general language that was
placed in the Constitution by the Framers for broader purposes. For
example, the Due Process Clause is sometimes invoked to protect
the territorial objective,47 and the Commerce Clause is often invoked
to achieve the free trade objective."
The only constitutional limitation directed expressly to state
taxation is the Import-Export Clause:
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be
absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws; and the
net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on
Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the
United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revi-
sion and Control of the Congress.49
Although this express prohibition has been construed to apply
only to international and not to interstate trade, 5 it nonetheless
serves both the territorial confinement and the free trade objectives,
albeit imperfectly. The fear that the great port states would take
advantage of their key locations to levy tribute upon imports from
foreign lands destined for other states was a prime justification for
the Import-Export Clause. Under the Articles of Confederation,
'7 See, e.g., Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 204 (1905).
11 See, e.g., Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946). Courts often confuse the
territorial and free trade objectives, and the Supreme Court has sometimes explicitly refused
to distinguish sharply between them. See, e.g., National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967).
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. A related limitation is the provision, found in art. I, §
10, cl. 3, that "no State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage."
A "Duty of Tonnage" includes "all taxes and duties regardless of their manner or form, and
even though not measured by the tonnage of the vessel, which operate to impose a charge for
the privilege of entering, trading in, or lying in a port." Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex
rel. State Docks Comm., 296 U.S. 261, 265-66 (1935).
" Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1868).
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"New Jersey, placed between Philadelphia and New York, was lik-
ened to a Cask tapped at both ends; and North Carolina between
Virginia and South Carolina to a patient bleeding at both Arms. '51
Through the Export-Import Clause the Framers sought to eliminate
this limited but economically significant instance of state taxation
having an incidence beyond the confines of the state.
The Import-Export Clause had another purpose as well-to
ensure that the power granted to the Congress to "lay and collect
• ..Duties [and] Imposts ' 52 would be a monopoly power. The
federal government would thus be able to adopt a commercial policy
responsive to the overall interests of the new nation, balancing the
desire of one state to protect its industries against the desire of
another to benefit from the lower consumer prices attainable
through free trade. Hand in hand with the objective of giving the
national government the sole right to make tradeoffs between prod-
ucer and consumer interests was the objective of assuring the federal
government a secure source of revenues. Since, as we shall see, the
power to tax property was to be reserved to the states, 5 the chief
source of federal revenue was expected to be (and was in fact until
the Twentieth Century) customs revenue. The success of the Foun-
ders' great venture depended upon preserving a national monopoly
over customs revenue.
54
Because the Import-Export Clause applies only to international
commerce, the principal constitutional limitations on the states
must be implied, as suggested above, from more general clauses. To
do so has been one of the great, and never finished, tasks of the
Supreme Court. The most interesting development has been the
Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause. On its face, the
Commerce Clause does no more than grant to Congress the power
"[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes. '55 But by negative impli-
cation the congressional power to regulate interstate commerce has
been construed to deprive the states of the power to regulate such
5, Madison, Preface to Debates in the Convention of 1787 in RECORDS OF THE CONSTrru-
TIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 542 (M. Farrand ed. 1937) (abbreviations in original text are
spelled out).
52 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
m See text at note 81 infra.
A On the purposes of the Import-Export Clause, see Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423
U.S. 276, 283-94 (1976); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534, 551 (1959)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827); Hellerstein,
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages: Enhanced State Power to Tax Imports, 1976 Sup. CT. REV.
99.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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commerce in certain circumstances, even with respect to activities
Congress has not sought to regulate. 6 Moreover, this implied limita-
tion on the states' regulatory power has been extended to limit state
taxation of interstate commerce. 57
Many thousands of pages of the U.S. Reports have been de-
voted to the subject of determining just what state taxation is pre-
cluded by the Commerce Clause. It would hardly serve our purpose
here to review the state taxation cases when no less a scholar and
judge than Justice Frankfurter has declared:
The history of this problem is spread over hundreds of volumes
of our Reports. To attempt to harmonize all that has been said
in the past would neither clarify what has gone before nor guide
the future. Suffice it to say that especially in this field opinions
must be read in the setting of the particular cases and as the
product of preoccupation with their special facts. 8
But it would be a mistake to leave the impression that goods im-
ported into a state from another state, and the income earned
thereby, are totally immune from taxation in the importing state.
When a tax is nondiscriminatory and fairly apportioned-and hence
does not serve to protect local industry, to impose overtly the bur-
den of taxation on citizens of other states, or to subject interstate
business to a cumulative or multiple tax burden not borne by local
business" t-chances are the tax will be upheld against constitutional
objections. Certainly, the fact that a business firm operates in inter-
state commerce will not prevent a state from taxing an aliquot
portion of its sales or income."0 Perhaps the best summary of the
situation is still to be found in a half-century old article by Professor
Thomas Reed Powell:
Law, like politics, makes strange bedfellows. Among the queer-
" Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851).
" See, e.g., Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1873). The foreign
commerce portion of the Commerce Clause also restricts state taxation and to that extent
duplicates the Import-Export Clause. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946).
On the multiple burden test, see Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S.
250, 258, 260 (1938); Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business and the Supreme
Court, 1974 Term, 62 VA. L. Rxv. 149, 150-51 (1976).
" Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 97 S. Ct. 1076 (1977) (sales tax); Northwestern
States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959) (net income tax). The Con-
gress has repeatedly attempted without success to enact comprehensive legislation that would
provide a formula for allocating the income of interstate businesses among the states. At
present many states have adhered to a Multistate Tax Compact with roughly the same
objectives. See Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business and the Supreme Court,
1974 Term, 62 VA. L. Rlv. 149, 153-54, nn.22 & 23 (1976).
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est of such companions are the doctrine that the states cannot
tax interstate commerce and the fact that they can. As might
be anticipated, the doctrine and the fact do not dwell together
in perfect amity. The efforts of the Supreme Court to mediate
between them have as a rule failed to give full satisfaction to
either. . . . The truth is that there is a wrong way and a right
way for the states to tax interstate commerce. When the wrong
way is adopted, the doctrine maintains its supremacy. When
the right way is chosen, the fact prevails. The doctrine then
saves its face by the nominalistic legerdemain of asserting that
what is being taxed is not interstate commerce but something
else. This something else is usually called property. . . . Thus
by renaming, the cabbage becomes a rose, and the doctrine
that the states cannot tax interstate commerce still struts as a
universal though palpably it is something less."
When a state taxes what is clearly property, income, or activi-
ties within its borders, and thus does not raise issues of protection-
ism, extraterritoriality, or multiple burdens, there are few federal
constitutional limitations on its powers. Of course, the states have
their own constitutions, and these instruments may impose sub-
stantial limitations on a state's choice of the types and maximum
amounts of taxes to impose.2 But the federal Constitution limits
neither the kinds of taxes that may be imposed nor the maximum
rate of tax. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly said, even a state
tax so burdensome as to destroy a business does not violate the
Constitution. 3
Taxation, like any other act of a state, is subject to the constitu-
tional guarantees of individual liberties. Thus, a tax bearing selec-
tively on speech or the exercise of religion would likely run afoul of
the first amendment. 4 Perhaps the principal general constitutional
1, Powell, State Income Taxes and the Commerce Clause, 31 YALE L.J. 799, 799-800
(1922).
62 The Illinois Constitution, for example, forbids the legislature to enact a graduated
income tax, prohibits counties from assessing real property used in farming at a higher level
than single family residential property for property tax purposes, and mandates the eventual
abolition of local ad valorem personal property taxes. ILL. CONST. art. 9, §§ 3(a),4(b),5(c).
63 Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550, 562-63 (1935); Rox v. Standard Oil Co.,
294 U.S. 87, 99-100 (1935); A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 45-46 (1934); Alaska
Fish Salting & By-Products Co. v. Smith, 255 U.S. 44, 48-49 (1921).
61 See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944). Although the first amend-
ment by its terms limits only congressional legislation, its guarantees have been held applica-
ble to the states by the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940).
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safeguard used to strike down state tax legislation has been the
Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment15 State clas-
sifications of taxpayers and their activities for purposes of applying
differing taxes or tax rates might be held so discriminatory or arbi-
trary as to transgress the Equal Protection Clause," but states are
ordinarily given wide discretion in these matters. 7 The principal use
of the Equal Protection Clause has been to strike down state tax
statutes discriminating against out-of-state corporations'l-a fur-
ther illustration of the point that the Supreme Court's primary
concern has been with restricting the power of the states to cast the
burden of local taxation on those outside the state or to protect local
business.
D. Limitations on Federal Taxation
The taxing power of the federal government is even freer of
express constitutional limitations than is the state power. As in the
case of the states, the federal government is limited in its power to
tax speech and the exercise of religion, and it may not use the taxing
power in violation of due process or equal protection." But since the
federal government is vested with the power to protect domestic
enterprise through the imposition of "Duties" and "Imposts" on
imports, and to regulate commerce under the Commerce Clause,
there is correspondingly less scope for these protections to operate.
A procedural limitation is placed on the decision to tax: "All
Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representa-
,1 The Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment has had its principal application
to state taxation through its limitation on the territorial reach of a state's taxing power. See
note 47 supra. But the Due Process Clause is also sometimes held to limit the measure of a
tax, as where a state improperly imputes the income of one person to another. Hoeper v. Tax
Comm'n, 284 U.S. 206 (1931). A provision of some importance in constraining state discrimi-
nation against nonresidents is the privileges and immunities clause of art. IV, § 2. See
Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
" See, e.g., Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928).
,T The Supreme Court in recent decades has refused to hold classifications affecting
property, income, or activities that are purely internal to the taxing state unconstitutional.
See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S.
356 (1973). Recent cases striking down state taxing statutes on equal protection grounds are
state court decisions, usually relying on equal protection clauses in state constitutions. See
note 139 infra.
" WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117 (1968); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337
U.S. 562 (1949).
" Although the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment does not apply
to the federal government, the fifth amendment has been held to prohibit discrimination that
"may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499 (1954).
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tives."70 It was the practice in Britain for money bills to originate
in the lower house, and a similar practice had been followed in the
American states." But this limitation had a special significance
under the new Constitution since Senators were elected by their
state legislatures rather than directly by the people of their states.7"
Moreover, as part of a fundamental constitutional compromise, the
more populous states were more heavily represented in the House
than in the Senate, where each state had two members.
The only express substantive limitation on the subject matter
of federal taxation is the provision that "[n]o Tax or Duty shall be
laid on Articles exported from any State."73 This prohibition, which
applies only to exports from the United States and not to exports
from one state to another,74 corresponds in scope to the export half
of the Import-Export Clause limitation on state taxation. But the
Federal Export Clause had a somewhat different purpose. It was
originally intended as a guarantee to the Southern states that the
more populous Northern states would not seek to finance the federal
government through a levy on Southern agricultural exports. 75
The most important constitutional provisions bearing on the
federal government's power to tax are the Uniformity and Appor-
tionment Clauses. They do not in terms restrict the kinds of taxes
the federal government may levy, but they nonetheless do so in
practice. The Uniformity Clause requires that "all Duties, Imposts
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. '76 The
Apportionment Clause, on the other hand, provides that "[n]o
Capitation, or other direct Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion
to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken. '7
The key distinction is whether a federal tax is an indirect tax (that
is, a "duty, impost or excise") in which case uniformity is required,
or a direct tax, in which case apportionment is required.
70 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. This provision goes on to permit the Senate to "propose or
concur with amendments as on other Bills." James Madison explained as follows the reason
for this amending power in the Senate: "When you send a bill to the Senate, without the
power of making any alteration, you force them to reject the bill. . . . The power of proposing
alterations removes this inconvenience . 3 DEBATES OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 376
(J. Elliot ed. 1836).
11 D. HUTCHISON, THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION 73 (1975).
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
73 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
7' Turpin v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 504, 507 (1886).
,1 See D. HUTCHISON, THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION 143-44, 151 (1975).
76 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
7" Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. The Apportionment Clause is bolstered by the Census Clause,
which states that "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States . . . according to the respective Numbers." Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
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Uniformity is relatively easy to achieve. The requirement refers
to geographical uniformity.7 Wherever an activity or article ap-
pears, it must be taxed at the same rate.79 If liquor, for example, is
produced in Kentucky and not in New York, then a tax on the
manufacture of liquor is nonetheless uniform though no New York
enterprise pays the tax."0
Apportionment is another matter entirely. If a tax is a direct
tax and therefore must be apportioned in accordance with the pre-
vious census, then the amount of tax raised per capita must be the
same in each state. Only a capitation tax (involving a per-person
levy) would be likely to lend itself to apportionment. Property taxes,
which are likewise direct taxes, could meet the apportionment re-
quirement only if the rate were set at a different level in each state
so that the yield from the tax was in accordance with population.
Apportionment of property taxes would be an administratively diffi-
cult undertaking, though property taxes were imposed by the fed-
eral government and apportioned among the states on a number of
occasions in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries.8' The conse-
quence of the Apportionment Clause is to leave the taxation of real
and personal property to state and local governments. Property tax
collections have consistently been the most important source of
local government revenue.
The Apportionment Clause has been modified by the sixteenth
amendment. That amendment was a response to the 1895 decision
in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,12 where the Supreme Court
held that the newly enacted federal income tax was a direct tax (on
the theory that a tax on income from property is in substance a tax
on the underlying property) and hence unconstitutional because it
was not apportioned among the states. The sixteenth amendment,
ratified in 1913, made clear that Congress might tax "income, from
whatever source derived, without an apportionment among the sev-
eral States, and without regard to any census or enumeration."
Today both the federal government and nearly all of the states
(and to an increasing extent local municipalities) derive revenues
from income taxes, with the federal government collecting $173.0
billion and the state and local governments collecting $28.8 billion
" Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 92 (1900).
" Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 594-95 (1884).
S. MILLER, LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 240-41 (1891).
SI The statutes are discussed in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 572-
73 (1895).
2 158 U.S. 601, vacating on rehearing 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
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from personal and corporate income taxes in 1976.83 Each jurisdic-
tion imposes its own tax, and the definitions, exceptions, deduc-
tions, and rates differ between federal law and state law as well as
among the states. Nonetheless, an increasing number of states have
conformed their personal income tax statutes to federal law to bene-
fit the taxpayer by eliminating the need to file completely different
income tax returns with the two levels of government.84
E. Intergovernmental Tax Immunities
One of the most important constitutional restraints on both
federal and state taxation is not to be found in the text of the
Constitution at all. This is the doctrine of intergovernmental tax
immunities, a doctrine which the Supreme Court has found in the
federal structure of government created by the Constitution.8 5 The
core of this doctrine is that the federal government may not tax the
states, and the states may not tax the federal government. "The
power to tax involves the power to destroy," said Justice Marshall
in the landmark case of McCulloch v. Maryland8 where a discrimi-
natory state tax on bank notes issued by the Bank of the United
States, a federally chartered bank, was held unconstitutional be-
cause it interfered with an instrumentality created by the
"necessary and proper" exercise of express congressional powers.87
As illustrated by this first case, where 80% of the stock of the
Bank was held by private parties, the key question in defining the
scope of intergovernmental immunities is whether the object of tax-
ation is "so assimilated by the Government as to become one of its
constituent parts."88 In the absence of either constitutional text or
any well-defined theory justifying the immunity, this question is not
n ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF FIS-
CAL FEDERALISM 1976-77: REVENUE AND DEBT 10 (Table 5) (1977) [hereinafter cited as REVENUE
AND DEBT].
" Id. at 290 (Table 110).
5 Earlier cases derived the immunity of states from federal taxation from the tenth
amendment, see, e.g., Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871), discussed in text at
note 89 infra. Federal immunity from state taxation is often derived from the Supremacy
Clause of art. VI. See, e.g., United States v. County of Fresno, 97 S. Ct. 699, 700, 702 (1977).
The soundest view, however, appears to be that the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immun-
ity is implied by the overall federal structure created by the Constitution. See C. BLACK,
STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7, 11, 13-15 (1969).
1, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).
87 Art. I, § 8, cl. 18 of the Constitution grants Congress power "[tlo make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" other powers of the federal govern-
ment.
R United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484, 486 (1958).
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easily answered. After Collector v. Day,"' an 1871 decision holding
the salary of a state judge immune from federal taxation, the scope
of intergovernmental immunities gradually expanded until in 1928
royalties on federal patents were held immune from state taxation."
Thereafter, the scope of the immunity was drastically reduced by a
series of Supreme Court decisions." But something of the doctrine
of intergovernmental tax immunities remains, as the Court made
clear in the course of denying the State of New York immunity from
federal taxation on sales of mineral water from state-owned mineral
springs. 2 Chief Justice Stone, speaking for four members of the
Court, cited as examples of what would remain immune from fed-
eral taxation the "State's capitol, its State-house, its public school
houses, public parks, [and] its revenues from taxes or school
lands." 3
Today the principal fiscal consequence of the doctrine of inter-
governmental tax immunities is the exemption of interest on state
and local bonds from federal income tax. This "municipal bond"
exemption will cost the federal treasury over $5.3 billion in fiscal
1978.'1 Tax-exempt bonds can be sold at a much lower rate of inter-
est than would be required if the interest were taxable to the recipi-
ent. Thus the exemption, which has been written into the Internal
Revenue Code,15 can be viewed as a disguised subsidy to municipali-
ties, whose construction programs are financed largely by bonds.
Although the Supreme Court in the Pollock case unanimously held
interest on municipal bonds exempt from federal income tax on
intergovernmental immunity grounds," the general view today is
that the Court would probably uphold legislative elimination of the
exemption7
" 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871).
" Long v. Rockwood, 277 U.S. 142 (1928).
For example, Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932), overruled Long v. Rock-
wood, 277 U.S. 142 (1928), and Graves v. New York ex. rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939),
overruled Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871).
,2 New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
" Id. at 587-88. Justice Frankfurter made the same point in his opinion, joined only by
Justice Rutledge, announcing the judgment of the Court. Id. at 582. The recent decision in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), although not dealing with taxation,
demonstrates the continued vitality of the intergovernmental immunity principle.
'" SPECIAL ANALYSES 1978, supra note 7, at 129 (Table F-i). A corresponding exemption
of interest on federal bonds from state and local taxation is also of some fiscal importance.
" I.R.C. § 103.
" Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583-86 (1895).
" For an argument presenting this view, see DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, TAXATION OF Gov-
ERNMENT BONDHOLDERS AND EMPLOYEES (1938).
19771
The University of Chicago Law Review
F. Limitations on Expenditures
The Constitution contains few limitations on expenditures as
such. Moreover, the limitations on spending that do exist are only
infrequently construed by the courts, since restrictions on the stand-
ing of citizens to challenge the constitutionality of spending stat-
utes, though relaxed in recent years, continue to deter litigation."
Congress is empowered to raise revenues "to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United
States."9 This provision does not, however, impose any effective
limit on the scope of the federal spending power. In construing the
Spending Clause the Supreme Court has declared that Congress is
not limited in spending by the other enumerated powers of Article
I but may spend for the "general welfare."10 And the "general wel-
fare" criterion is not itself a limitation on the congressional power
to spend, as the Court made plain in the course of upholding the
public financing of presidential campaigns established by the 1974
amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act. 1 Neverthe-
less, the Bill of Rights, and in particular the first amendment provi-
sion prohibiting Congress from passing laws "respecting an Estab-
lishment of Religion," place a limit on particular types of federal
expenditures. 0 2
Whether the federal government's power to spend is limited in
any way by more general considerations of federalism is an open
question. In the 1936 decision in United States v. Butler,'°3 the
Supreme Court declared a federal tax-and-expenditure scheme un-
constitutional on the ground that the expenditure portion, authoriz-
ing payments to farmers who agreed to acreage restrictions, invaded
the powers reserved to the states by the tenth amendment. The
Court characterized the spending provisions as "a scheme for pur-
chasing with federal funds submission to federal regulation of a
subject reserved to the states.""4 Yet one year later the Court se-
verely limited Butler, holding that Congress could impose on em-
ployers a federal tax reducible by credits for contributions to state
unemployment funds conforming to federally prescribed criteria."'
11 Compare Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), with United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166 (1974), and Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
' United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936) (dictum).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976).
,02 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
" 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
,04 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 72 (1936); see also United States v. Gerlach Live
Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 738 (1950).
"I Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 48 (1937).
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The Court's ruling implied that Congress could impose restrictions
on a state's right to receive federal grants-in-aid without violating
the tenth amendment."6 The use of both of these techniques has
become common. 07
Nonetheless, the decision in Butler has never been overruled,
and the Supreme Court would probably recognize an implied limi-
tation on the federal spending power if that power was used to
encroach on essential governmental functions of the states. Such a
limitation might be either implied from the constitutional choice of
a federal system (much in the way that intergovernmental tax im-
munities were derived) or found in the tenth amendment. That
amendment, it will be recalled, provides that "powers not delegated
to the United States nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the People." Although in the past
treated by the Supreme Court as a truism-namely, that powers not
delegated are necessarily reserved"' 8-the tenth amendment has re-
cently experienced at least a partial reinvigoration. In National
League of Cities v. Usery, "9 a closely divided Court struck down a
federal statute imposing minimum wage and hour regulations on
state and local governments, ruling that this exercise of the com-
merce power violated state sovereignty. The Court specifically re-
served the question whether Congress might constitutionally "affect
integral operations of state governments by exercising authority
granted it under other sections of the Constitution such as the
Spending Power . . . ."I" This language should probably be read
in conjunction with the dissenters' reference to the possibility that
"Congress may nevertheless accomplish its objectives. . . by condi-
tioning grants of federal funds upon compliance with federal mini-
mum wage and overtime standards. . . ."" If National League of
Cities is interpreted as establishing a balancing test weighing the
relative importance of the federal interest against the strength of the
I" The Court held that Congress could induce state legislatures to participate in the
unemployment insurance scheme by offering local employers a credit against the federal
employment tax. The tax credit fell short of the type of "undue influence" or "coercion" of a
state that would violate the tenth amendment. Id. at 585-93. The Court later extended the
noncoercion rationale to sustain the use of conditional grants-in-aid. Oklahoma v. United
States Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 142-44 (1947).
"0 For example, the system of unemployment insurance sustained in Steward Machine
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), is essentially equivalent to the one in use today. See text
at note 160 infra.
' United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). See also note 11 supra.
426 U.S. 833 (1976).
" Id. at 852 n.17.
" Id. at 880 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
19771
The University of Chicago Law Review
state's interest in autonomy, 12 then in extreme cases the balance
may swing against federal grants-in-aid that impose conditions sub-
verting the independence of state legislatures.
The constitutionally permissible scope of state and local spend-
ing has not been widely litigated or discussed. The issue is not
addressed in the Constitution. But general principles derived from
cases involving state regulation suggest that limits do exist. States
could not, for example, create a barrier to interstate commerce
through use of the spending power. Similarly, if Congress, acting
within its constitutional powers, enacted a spending program to
achieve a particular objective, a state spending program that frus-
trated the achievement of that objective might be held invalid
under the Supremacy Clause."' The fact that a subject may be
prima facie national in character does not, however, oust the states.
States provide for the common defense by maintaining militias,
although today those militias form the National Guard and are
financed largely by the federal government. Similarly, although
"[n]o state may enter into any Treaty" and foreign affairs is ob-
viously a national concern, many states maintain representational
offices in foreign countries for the purpose of stimulating demand
for their exports and attracting foreign capital.
II. THE GERMAN FISCAL CONSTITUTON: A CONTRASTING APPROACH
One can gain a firmer grasp of the distinctive character of the
American Fiscal Constitution by looking at the fiscal constitution
of the Federal Republic of Germany. The contrast is particularly
dramatic between the formal fiscal provisions of the U.S. Constitu-
tion and those of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of the Federal Re-
public. The provisions of the Basic Law governing the fiscal rela-
tions between the Federation and the Ldnder are drawn together in
a single chapter, ' giving fiscal federalism in the Federal Republic
a constitutional explicitness and structure almost totally lacking in
the United States. The greater detail of the Basic Law is explained
in part by the time of its adoption. In 1949 the taxing opportunities
,,2 See id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Note, The Clean Air Act Amendments of
1970: A Threat to Federalism? 76 COLUM. L. REv. 990 (1976).
"' U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; cf. Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971) (ruling that
state implementing legislation inconsistent with the federal Social Security Act violates the
Supremacy Clause).
"I GG arts. 104a-115 (Chapter X). This chapter governs not merely fiscal but also
budget, audit, and credit matters. Two important fiscal provisions not in Chapter X are arts.
91a and 91b (Chapter VIIa) on the "joint tasks" (Gemeinschaftsaufgaben) of the Federation
and the Ldinder. See note 128 infra.
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and spending responsibilities of the modern state were far greater
than they had been in 1787, when the customs were by far the
principal source of revenue. Experience under prior German consti-
tutions may also have contributed to the greater specificity of the
German fiscal constitution.
The specificity of the Basic Law, if not a mistake, has certainly
had its costs. The revenue sharing provisions have at times served
as an impediment to the type of financial equilibrium between the
Federation and the Lander that the governments of both have de-
sired. As a consequence, the fiscal provisions of the Basic Law were
amended in 1955, 1957, 1967, and 1969. The last of these amend-
ments compounded the level of detail, although it also increased the
flexibility of the provisions governing federal fiscal legislation and
Federation-Lander cooporation."51
The fiscal provisions of the Basic Law carefully divide the tax-
ing competences of the Federation and the Lander. The Federation
alone benefits from customs duties and from a long list of miscella-
neous taxes. " 8 The Lander in turn have the exclusive benefit of
property, estate, and certain other taxes." 7 Receipts from three of
the most important taxes-personal and corporate income taxes
and the value-added tax-are shared among the Federation and the
Linder. "8 Thus, in contrast to general revenue sharing in the United
States, which is merely a federal spending program,1 revenue shar-
ing in West Germany is a true division of revenues from constitu-
tionally designated taxes. In keeping with the German tradition of
administration of federal laws by the Lander, these three shared
taxes, which generate about two-thirds of all revenues, 2 ' are col-
lected by the revenue authorities of the Lainder. 12
The Basic Law prescribes that the Federation and the Lander
share the receipts from personal and corporate income taxes
equally.2 2 The sharing ratio for the value-added tax, which is much
more significant in West Germany than is the sales tax in the
Is A brief survey of the background of the constitutional changes between 1949 and 1969
is provided by N. JOHNSON, GOVERNMENT IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 120-31 (1973).
, GG art. 106(1).
I7 GG art. 106(2). Municipalities (Gemeinden) benefit from real property and certain
other taxes, as well as from a share of the income tax. GG arts. 106(5),(6).
"s GG art. 106(3).
"' See text at notes 176-80 infra.
'm F. STRAuss, DIE FINANZVERFASSUNG 81-82 (1969). Although not an official government
document, this book was written while Strauss was Minister of Finance. The two-thirds
estimate excludes tax collections by municipalities.
"I1 GG art. 108.
1,2 GG art. 106(3).
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United States, 2 3 is established by legislation. Such legislation must
receive the assent of the Bundesrat, an upper house composed of
representatives of the Lander, and must also comply with specific
constitutional principles designed to achieve what is popularly
called "vertical equity."12
Even more striking to an American observer than the provisions
of the Basic Law providing for the sharing of revenues between the
Federation and the Lander are the provisions designed to redistri-
bute tax receipts among the Lander. The Basic Law promotes redis-
tribution among the Lander in two ways: vertically, through the
mechanism for revenue sharing, and horizontally, through the use
of equalization payments among the Lander.
One of the constitutional principles governing the sharing of
value-added tax receipts between the Federation and the Lander is
that uniformity of living standards is to be "ensured" throughoui
the country.11 To achieve this goal, at least three-quarters of the
Lander share of value-added tax receipts is distributed on a per
capita basis, unlike personal and corporate income tax receipts
which are returned to the Lander from which such taxes are col-
lected.126 Thus, the greater the share of value-added tax receipts
going to the Lander relative to the Federation, the greater the im-
pact revenue sharing will have in offsetting differences among the
Lander in taxing capacity. In addition, the Basic Law authorizes
federal legislation allocating up to 25% of the value-added tax re-
ceipts to Lander whose per capita revenues from Land taxes fall
below the average of all Lander. ' There are also other provisions
that enable the Federation to make grants of various kinds to the
Lander out of federal revenues. 128
'" The standard rate of value-added tax in West Germany is 11%. See generally
INTERNATIONAL BuREAu OF FIscAL DOCUMENTATION, THE TAXATION OF COMPANIES IN EuRoPE
paras. 309-335, at 105-12. In 1976 the Llnder received 31% of value added-tax revenues.
BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER FINANZEN, FINANZBERICHT 1976, at 131 (1976).
12 GG art. 106(3).
GG art. 107. The principle of uniform living standards is part of an interrelated group
of principles providing for the coordination of the revenue requirements of the Federation and
the Ldnder through multiyear planning so that "a fair balance is struck, any overburdening
of taxpayers precluded, and uniformity of living standards in the federal territory ensured."
GG art. 106(3)(2).
,ZS GG art. 107(1); Gesetz flber den Finanzausgleich zwischen Bund und Ldndern, § 2(1),
[1969] BGB1 [Bundesgesetzblatt] I 1432.
"' GG art. 107(1); Gesetz Cber den Finanzausgleich zwischen Bund und Landern, §§
2(2), (3), [1969] BGB1 11432.
"2 The Basic Law requires federal financing of at least one-half of the expenditures
incurred in "joint tasks" (Gemeinschaftsaufgaben) in higher education, regional develop-
ment, agricultural development, and coastal preservation. GG art. 91a. The Federation is also
empowered to grant financial assistance to the Lrnder for "important investments" meeting
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The second, and to the American observer even more remark-
able, means of redistributing tax revenues is the requirement that
financially strong Ldnder make equalization payments directly to
financially weak Liinder. ' 9One of the explicit goals of the Basic Law
is "reasonable equalization between financially strong and finan-
cially weak Ldnder. ,130 By statute, equalization payments must
bring the financially weak Lander to within 95% of a target figure
which is roughly equivalent to a national average. 131 As a result, in
1975 four financially strong Ldnder made payments totalling about
DM 1.9 billion (1.3% of all Lander expenditures) to the remaining
five Lander.132
Another major tenet of German federalism is equalization of
tax burdens throughout the nation. Uniform federal legislation gov-
erns not only the taxes accruing to the Federation and shared with
the Lander, but also many of the taxes that accrue solely to the
Lander. Property and estate taxes are created and regulated by
federal legislation, though the Lander enjoy all of the proceeds.
When the federal legislature acts with respect to these taxes, it
normally sets the same rates throughout the country. 3 3 Indeed, one
broadly defined criteria. GG art. 104(a)(4). See also GG art. 106(4), providing for federal
compensation to Lander for increased burdens stemming from the establishment of federal
facilities within their borders.
,2, GG art. 107(2). This article imposes a duty on the legislature to pass legislation
specifying the conditions under which equalization payments are to be made and the criteria
for determining the amounts. Such legislation may also provide for grants of federal funds to
financially weak Lander.
130 Id.
"I Gesetz aber den Finanzausgleich zwischen Bund und Ldndern, § 10(3), [1969] BGB1
I 1432, 1434.
132 BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER FiNANZEN, FiNANZBERICHT 1976, at 141 (1976). The paying
Lander were Nordrhein-Westfalen, Baden-Wgrttemberg, Hessen, and Hamburg; and the
recipient Lander were Bayern, Niedersachsen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Schleswig-Holstein, Saar-
land, and Bremen. Id. Additional supplementary federal allocations of value-added tax re-
ceipts to financially weak Lander, see text at note 127 supra, amounted to another DM 800
million in 1975. Id.
i= See H. GRUMPEL, TAXATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIc OF GERMANY 1/3.2 (2d ed. 1969)
(World Tax Series). Under Article 105(2) the Federation has concurrent legislative powers
over not only all taxes that accrue wholly or in part to the Federation but also over all taxes
"where the conditions provided for in paragraph (2) of Art. 72 apply." Since Article 72(2) is
phrased broadly, the Federation may legislate on substantially all taxes except local excise
taxes ("ortlichen Verbrauch-und-Aufwandsteuern"). These taxes are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Lander "as long and in so far as they are not identical with taxes imposed
by federal legislation." GG art. 105(2a). Although federal legislative jurisdiction over other
Land taxes is only concurrent, such federal tax legislation preempts Land legislation pro
tanto. The result is that tax burdens are virtually uniform throughout the country. One
exception is that federal legislation establishing the real property tax permits municipalities
to vary the rate within certain limits. INTERNATIONAL BUREAU OF FIscAL DOCUMENTATION, THE
TAXATION OF COMPANIES IN EUROPE para. 302, at 93 (1975).
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of the criteria permitting federal legislation on taxes accruing solely
to the Lander is the necessity for "the maintenance of legal or eco-
nomic unity, especially the maintenance of uniformity of living con-
ditions beyond the territory of any one Land.""3 4 Thus the Basic Law
goes far toward making equality of total tax burdens among the
Lander into a constitutional principle.
I. FISCAL FEDERALISM IN PRACTICE
The American Constitution, unlike the West German Basic
Law, has few provisions governing the fiscal relations between the
federation and the states. As the review of the American Fiscal
Constitution in Part I showed, relatively few constitutional limita-
tions have been imposed on the taxes that may be levied by either
level of government or on the purposes for which either may spend.
Moreover, despite the Supremacy Clause, there is no U.S. rule that
a particular federal tax-such as the income tax-preempts a simi-
lar state tax. Nevertheless, the pattern of taxing and spending in
the United States reveals a set of working assumptions about the
fiscal prerogatives and responsibilities of each level of government.
The federal government and the states have specialized, with the
federal government taxing different sources of income from those
taxed by the states and spending its funds on different objectives.
Although the basic allocation of fiscal authority is remarkably sta-
ble, the area of overlap on the expenditure side has been growing
as the federal government has assumed increasing financial respon-
sibilty for such traditional state activities as education, highways,
and welfare.
A. Taxation
As we have seen, the Constitution reserves customs duties to
the federal government. But the customs today provide only about
1% of total federal revenues. The principal source of federal revenue
is the personal and corporate income tax, with the personal income
tax accounting for about 44% and the corporate income tax about
14% of federal revenues. By far the most rapidly growing source of
revenue is social insurance taxes and contributions, now accounting
I' GG art. 72(2)(3). The other criteria for federal legislation are that "a matter cannot
be effectively regulated by the legislation of individual Lander" or that "the regulation of a
matter by a Land law might prejudice the interests of other Lander or of the people as a whole
... :" GG arts. 72(2)(1), 72(2)(2). When one or more of these criteria are satisfied the
federation is given authority to regulate taxes accruing solely to the Lander. GG art. 105(2);
see note 133 supra.
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for over 31% of federal receipts. 3' Since these social insurance reve-
nues flow into so-called trust funds, which are earmarked for de-
fined expenditures, many Americans do not think of social insur-
ance taxes as federal revenues but rather as a separate tax-and-
expenditure system. Indeed, it is conventional to distinguish be-
tween general revenues and trust fund revenues, although for pur-
poses of macroeconomics, as opposed to bookkeeping, there is no
substantial difference.
The revenues of state and local governments are nearly as large
as those of the federal government. If one excludes grants-in-aid,
state utility and liquor store receipts, and trust fund receipts, com-
bined state and local revenues are approaching federal revenues
($182 billion and $225 billion, respectively, in 1975).13s
The largest source of state and local revenues has traditionally
been the property tax, which provides somewhat over 22% of state
and local general revenues.137 As previously mentioned, this source
has been placed beyond the effective reach of the federal govern-
ment by the Apportionment Clause.' 38 Most states have ceded the
property tax to local governments, although state court cases ruling
that it violates the Equal Protection Clause or the equivalent state
constitutional provision to use local property taxes as the principal
means of financing local education may lead some states to adopt
statewide property tax systems to finance education. 39
The second largest source of state and local revenues (12.87%),
and one growing at a faster rate than property tax revenues, is sales
and gross receipts taxes. There is little overlap between federal and
state taxation in this category because, although both federal and
state governments impose taxes on sales, the federal "excise" tax is
limited to sales by manufacturers on a limited number of products
'' The statistics in this paragraph are taken from actual revenues for fiscal 1976, re-
ported in 1978 BUDGET, supra note 37, at 56-57.
'1 TRENDS, supra note 20, at 29 (Table XI). 1975 grants-in-aid were $48 billion and
federal trust fund revenues were $80 billion; state utility, liquor store, and trust fund revenues
amounted to $33 billion. Id. at 29, 35 (Tables XI, XIV). Borrowing is excluded from both
federal and state figures.
" REVENUE AND DEBT, supra note 83, at 30 (Table 16).
"' See text at note 81 supra.
'3' See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971) (Serrano 1); Serrano v.
Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1977) (Serrano II); Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457
(1972); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972), aff'd on other grounds,
62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973). But cf. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973) (supplementing state financing of public education with local ad valorem
property tax does not deprive families residing in districts with low property tax base of equal
protection). Certainly decisions like Serrano I will lead some states to increase the use of other
revenue sources to finance education.
1977l
The University of Chicago Law Review
while state and local sales taxes apply to virtually all final sales to
consumers. Although an increasing number of cities have imposed
sales taxes, the great bulk of sales tax revenue goes to state govern-
ments. Thus, within the states, competition for revenues is reduced
by the tradition that local governments depend primarily on prop-
erty taxes while state governments depend heavily on sales taxes.
Imbalances tend to be handled by intergovernmental transfers
within each state or by arrangements within a state for local govern-
ments to receive a portion of state collections within their bounda-
ries.
Personal and corporate income taxes (12.37%) are nearly as
important as sales taxes, and are growing at a faster rate than either
property or sales taxes. 40 Forty-one states have a personal income
tax,' and the number of municipal income tax systems is growing.
Competition for tax revenues between the states and the federal
government is largely confined to the income tax, but the serious-
ness of this competition has been limited by the provision of the
Internal Revenue Code permitting state income tax payments to be
deducted from taxable income for federal personal and corporate
income tax purposes.' This deduction makes it easier for states and
municipalities to increase income tax rates. Part of each dollar of
increased state taxation is in effect paid by foregone federal reve-
nues; the percentage thus picked up by the federal government
depends upon the marginal federal tax rate of the state taxpayers.
Similar indirect assistance is afforded by the federal income tax
deduction for state gasoline and property taxes.4 3 Revenue foregone
by the federal government because of the deductibility of state, taxes
is estimated to total about $13.5 billion in fiscal 1978, an amount
equal to more than 6% of total federal income tax receipts.'
B. Expenditures
The federal government and the states specialize in expendi-
tures as well as in taxes, but to a much lesser degree. Just over one-
1o0 Statistics on state and local tax revenues in this and preceding paragraphs are taken
from REVENUE AND DEBT, supra note 83, at 30 (Table 16).
141 2 ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF FISCAL
FEDERALISM 99 (Table 66)(1976-77 ed.). Three additional states tax some forms of income,
such as dividends, interest, or capital gains. New Jersey is the only state to introduce an
income tax since 1971, and such populous states as Florida and Texas do not have any
personal income tax. Forty-five states have a corporate income tax. Id.
142 I.R.C. § 164(a)(3).
13 I.R.C. §§ 164(a)(2), 164(a)(5).
I Receipts forgone are tabulated in SPECIAL ANALYSES 1978, supra note 7, at 269-70
(1977). For federal income tax receipts, see 1978 BUDGET, supra note 37, at 57.
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quarter of the national budget goes for national defense and foreign
aid, categories in which state spending is minimal. Another one-
tenth of the federal budget pays interest on the national debt. Re-
tirement annuities under the Social Security system, which have no
direct counterpart in the states, represent another one-fifth of the
federal budget. The bulk of the remaining one-third or so of the
budget is devoted to functions where both federal and state govern-
ments are active. In some of these areas, however, the federal role
may consist of making grants to the states, a subject to be discussed
separately below."'
Historically, the most important categories of state and local
expenditure have been education and highways. Grade and high
schools are operated by local goyernments-usually single purpose
"school districts"-but the money is provided by both local taxation
and aid provided by the states. In 1975, state and local governments
spent $69.8 billion on education, while the federal government spent
$13.1 billion, principally in transfers to states and localities.4 ' Thus,
the financing, as well as the provision, of education remains pre-
dominantly a state and local affair. Highways are also primarily a
state and local matter, with the states and localities responsible in
1973 for $18.6 billion out of a total of $19.2 billion expended on
highways by all levels of government. '47 Included within the state
and local spending total, however, is the contribution of a federal
highway trust fund earmarked for the construction of the interstate
highway system. This fund, financed in large part by a federal gaso-
line tax, has contributed about $6 billion per year to state and local
spending in recent years.1 48
The greatest interplay between federal and state expenditures
is found in the welfare sphere. Welfare has also become the center
of intense political debate about the respective roles of the federal
and state governments. Both federal and state welfare expenditures
have grown rapidly during the last decade. Using a narrow defini-
tion,146 federal welfare expenditures grew from $5.2 billion (less than
' Federal expenditures are listed by function in 1978 BuDnor, supra note 37, at 52.
'" TRENDS, supra note 20, at 25 (Table IX). State and local expenditure totals do not
include expenditures financed by federal grants-in-aid, but do include expenditures financed
by federal general revenue sharing.
"I J. MAXWELL & J. ARANSEN, FINANCING STATE AND LocAL GovERMENTS 260-61 (Tables
A-4, A-5)(3d ed. 1977).
"' SPECIAL ANALYsEs 1978, supra note 7, at 38 (Table B-8).
The narrow definition is the budget category entitled "public assistance and other
income supplements." The largest programs included are Aid to Families with Dependent
Children, Food Stamps, and Supplemental Security Income. See note 150 infra.
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3% of total expenditures) in fiscal 1970 to an estimated $26.2 billion
(more than 6% of total expenditures) in fiscal 1977. Taking a
broader measure that includes Social Security retirement and disa-
bility payments, "income security" expenditures grew from $43.8
billion (22% of total expenditures) in fiscal 1970 to an estimated
$116.0 billion (28%) in fiscal 1977.'1o
The federal government bears the bulk of welfare expenditures
(even taking the narrower measure). Although federalization of wel-
fare has long been a rallying cry of many social reformers, that goal
has in large measure already been reached through innumerable
incremental decisions. In 1960 the federal government paid only
44% of the total welfare bill, but by 1970 the federal percentage had
reached 71%, and by 1975, 77%.151
The principal welfare programs involve interesting examples of
federal-state cooperation. The Aid to Families with Dependent
Children program (AFDC), is administered by state and local gov-
ernments, but financed in part by the federal government. '52 It pro-
vides cash payments to some 5.6 million mothers with dependent
children.' 53 The states determine the level of payments, and the
federal government partially reimburses the states according to a
complex formula. The level of payments consequently varies from
state to state, depending upon how much each state is willing to
spend. Maximum AFDC payments for a family of four range from
$60 in Mississippi to $433 in Oregon and $514 in Hawaii.'54
I" Fiscal 1977 figures are from OFnCE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, FISCAL 1978 BUDGET
REVISIONS 59-60 (1977)[hereinafter cited as 1978 BUDGET REVISIONS]. (These figures reflect
Carter Administration adjustments to Ford Administration estimates.) Fiscal 1970 figures are
from OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL
YEAR 1972, at 81, 158 (1971). Because of changing budgetary categories the figures for the two
years may not be precisely comparable. Even the broad definition does not include unemploy-
ment insurance benefits, which grew from $3.4 billion in fiscal 1970 to an estimated $15.9
billion in fiscal 1977. 1978 BUDGET REVISIONS, supra, at 59-60. Nor does it include payments
to veterans, public employee retirement payments, and similar programs that keep millions
of the aged and disabled off welfare.
"I, TRENDS, supra note 20, at 27 (Table X). If state welfare expenditures financed by
federal general revenue sharing grants were counted in the federal column, the federal share
would be about 79% for 1975. See id. at 27 n.3. This calculation is based on an estimate of
1974 general revenue sharing grants.
152 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1970).
'M SPECIAL ANALYSES 1978, supra note 7, at 236 (Table L-7). A few states have AFDC-UF
programs for families with unemployed fathers.
M5 NATIONAL CENTER FOR SOCIAL STATISTICS, DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE,
AID TO FAMILES wrrH DEPENDENT CHILDREN 10 (Table 4)(February 1977). See generally STAFF
OF SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POLICY OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 93D CONG., 2D SESS., HANDBOOK
ON PtmUIC INCOME TRANSFER PROGRAMS: 1975, at 140-70 (Comm. Print 1974) (Studies in Public
Welfare Paper No. 20).
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Quite different federal-state relationships are found in other
welfare programs. In the Food Stamp program, the federal govern-
ment provides the funds, and the states administer the program. 15
The rapid growth of this program, from $0.6 billion in fiscal 1970 to
an estimated $5.5 billion in fiscal 1977, accounts for a substantial
portion of the increase in federal welfare financing. 5 '
Equally important in the movement toward federal financing
of welfare is the Supplemental Security Income program (SSI), 157
passed in 1974. This program shifted responsibility for the funding
and administration of public assistance programs for the aged, the
blind, and the disabled to the federal government. As part of a
legislative compromise the states were permitted to supplement the
federal payments. Because of these supplemental state payments
only 73% of total SSI payments were funded by the federal govern-
ment in 1975.1"'
Still another relationship is found in the unemployment insur-
ance system,"9 which is not usually classified as welfare because its
benefits are available to an eligible unemployed person even if he
can support himself from investment income or from the earnings
of his spouse. The key to the program is a federal unemployment
tax levied on employers at the rate of 3.2% of payrolls. If the state
maintains an unemployment insurance program conforming to con-
ditions established in the federal statute (and all states do so), the
employer can credit the state unemployment tax against the federal
tax. Indeed, the federal statute permits the states to tax employers
on an experience rating basis, so that the better the record of the
employer in providing stable employment, the lower his tax; to
achieve this objective and to provide an incentive for stable employ-
ment, the employer is permitted to credit the maximum rate of state
tax (up to 2.7%) whether it is actually paid or forgiven under the
state experience rating formula.' State unemployment tax collec-
tions are deposited in individual unemployment trust fund accounts
1- 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2025 (1970).
1-4 Fiscal 1977 figures are from 1978 BUDGET REvIsIONS, supra note 150, at 59 (1977)
(including Carter Administration adjustments to Ford Adminitration estimates). Fiscal 1970
figures are from SPEcIAL ANALYsES, supra note 7, at 192 (Table L-9) (1971).
'7 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385 (Supp. IV 1974).
15 For further details, see Hawkins, State Supplementation under SSI, 1975, Soc. SEcu-
RmT BULL., Feb. 1977, at 12.
"' 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504 (1970); I.R.C. §§ 3301-3308.
'" Because of the demands on the trust funds in the recent recession, the net federal tax
has been increased temporarily from 0.5% (3.2% less 2.7%) to 0.7% in order to repay loans
made to the trust fund out of general revenues. Unemployment Compensation Amendments
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-566, § 211, 90 Stat. 2667.
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in the U.S. Treasury and may be withdrawn only for the payment
of benefits conforming to federal criteria. The unemployed worker
receives individual payments from a state office.
The amount of unemployment benefits is within the discretion
of the states, and varies widely not merely in absolute amount, but
also in the percentage of the unemployed worker's former wages
replaced by benefits. Although the Nixon Administration twice pro-
posed to the Congress legislation providing for federal minimum
standards in order to bring up payments in laggard states,'"' oppo-
nents were able to defeat any attempt to achieve what in this con-
text was pejoratively called the "federalization" of the unemploy-
ment insurance system. On top of this federal-state structure, Con-
gress has during periods of high unemployment provided for
"extended benefits" that continue payments to unemployed work-
ers beyond the 26 weeks involved in the regular program up to a
total of 65 weeks. Extended benefits are financed out of the federal
unemployment tax and general federal revenues rather than out of
state trust funds.16 2
C. Intergovernmental Transfers
The American Constitution contains nothing resembling the
provisions in the German Basic Law that provide for sharing of
revenues between the federation and the Lander and for equaliza-
tion payments among the Lander. Nevertheless, transfer payments
from the U.S. federal government to state and local governments
have become a major feature of the informal American fiscal consti-
tution. Although these payments are only partially designed to re-
dress the balance of fiscal power between the federal government
and the states, and are not ostensibly intended to redistribute reve-
nues among the states, it is clear that federal transfer payments
could at least potentially have a substantial impact on the distribu-
tion of revenues.
1. Grants-in-Aid. Beginning in the mid-1960's, grants-in-aid
became one of the principal tools for federal attempts to cope with
a wide range of domestic problems. Although many grants-in-aid
are related to welfare programs, transfers from the federal govern-
ment to the states far transcend the welfare area. Federal grants-
in-aid are used across virtually the entire gamut of state activity,
' PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT 496, 498 (1969); id. at 281, 282 (1973).
l On the unemployment insurance system, see generally SunComm. ON FISCAL POLICY OF
THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC INCOME TRANSFER PROGRAMS: 1975, at 50-
84 (Comm. Print 1974) (Studies in Public Welfare Paper No. 20).
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from environmental protection to education to law enforcement.
They finance, at least in part, such diverse state activities as high-
way beautification, disaster relief, preservation of historic proper-
ties, health services, and school lunches."'
The increasingly broad use of grants-in-aid has brought about
a rapid growth in federal transfers to state and local governments.
Grants-in-aid grew from $2.9 billion in 1954 (0.8% of GNP and
14.6% of the federal budget) to $10.4 billion in 1964 (1.6% of GNP
and 19.5% of the federal budget) to $43 billion in 1974 (3.1% of GNP
and 22.3% of the federal budget).6' In calendar 1975 alone grants-
in-aid grew by about 25% to over $54 billion"5 and are estimated at
over $70 billion for fiscal 1977.16
The total volume of grants-in-aid to states is not planned on
any overall basis such as state need. It is simply the sum of a large
number of individual federal decisions. Moreover, grants-in-aid are
not usually thought of as relieving the states of a burden; on the
contrary, state entitlement to federal grants often requires a match-
ing state payment for the program in question. The surplus or defi-
cit of the states as a whole does not appear, at least on casual
analysis, to be correlated with fluctuations in the volume of federal
grants-in-aid. Rather the states appear to have consolidated sur-
pluses in boom years and deficits in recession years, as tax revenues
fall but the momentum of spending continues.
Similarly, little attention is paid to the distribution of the total
flow of federal grants-in-aid among the states. Agricultural states do
well in the agricultural sector, and urban states do well in the wel-
fare sector, but the overall effect on the state tax burden and state
budgets appears to be the outcome of a series of unrelated decisions.
Grants-in-aid nevertheless play a limited redistributive role, as
the regression results summarized in Tables I and II show. The lower
the per capita income of a state, the higher the per capita grants-
in-aid. The same relationship holds between per capita federal per-
sonal tax receipts within a state and per capita grants-in-aid. These
measures of redistribution do not tell the whole story, however, as
the recent flurry of attention over the alleged tendency of the federal
113 SPEcuL ANALYSES 1978, supra note 7, at 282-87 (Table 0-9).
HI ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, TRENDS IN FISCAL FEDERALISM
1954-74, at 15 (Table IV)(1975).
'"ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 251 (Table B-68)(1976).
" SPEcuL ANALYSES, supra note 7, at 270 (Table 0-1) (1977). The grants-in-aid figures
in this paragraph include general revenue sharing.
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government to favor "sunbelt" states suggests. '67 In order to test the
validity of the "sunbelt hypothesis" as applied to grants-in-aid'68
and to determine whether other regional effects might explain the
variability in grants-in-aid among states, the nation was divided
into four regions (South, West, Northeast, and Midwest).' 9 The
regression results in Tables I and II hold redistribution effects con-
stant while measuring regional effects and, similarly, hold regional
effects constant while measuring redistribution effects.
TABLE I" ;"
Combined Redistribution and Regional Effects
in the U.S. Grants-in-Aid System, 1975
(based on per capita income)
Northeast Midwest South West
Gain (loss) ($20.74) ($18.08) $31.12 ($ 7.84)
from redistri-
bution effect
Gain (loss) $23.47 ($19.27) ($21.82) $30.74
from regional
effect
Combined gain $ 2.73 ($37.35) $ 9.30 $22.90
(loss)
Sources:
Grants-in-aid: DEP'T OF TREASURY, FEDERAL AID TO STATES, FIs-
CAL YEAR 1976 AND TRANSITION QUARTER 1 (1976); Personal
Income: STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 401-02
(Tables 643-44) (1976) ; Population: Id. at 11 (Table 10).
'" For a strong statement of the alleged tendency of federal spending to favor the sunbelt
states, see Federal Spending: The North's Loss Is the Sunbelt's Gain, 8 NAT'L J. 878 (1976).lu Most discussions of the sunbelt hypothesis are concerned with overall federal spending
rather than merely the grants-in-aid portion.
"I The regional boundaries chosen were the same as those used in the National Journal
study of overall federal spending. See Federal Spending, supra note 167. The Northeast
included the New England states plus New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. The Mid-
west included the Great Lakes states plus Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, and
the Dakotas. The South included Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, Arkansas,
Oklahoma, Texas, and states south and east thereof. The West included Montana, Wyoming,
Colorado, New Mexico, and states west thereof. Alaska, the state with the highest per capita
income in the nation, was excluded from these regressions because its extremely high level
of grants proved to affect overall results disproportionately.
,"' These results were obtained by estimating a regression of the form:
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TABLE IF"'
Combined Redistribution and Regional Effects
in the U.S. Grant-in-aid System, 1975
(based on per capita personal tax collections)
Northeast Midwest South West
Gain (loss) ($38.95) ($38.16) $43.27 $ 9.68
from redistri-
bution effect
Gain (loss) $22.66 ($19.34) ($18.30) $26.74
from regional
effect
Combined gain
(loss) ($16.29) ($57.50) $24.97 $36.42
Sources:
Grants-in-aid and Population: see Table I; Taxation: STATISTICAL
APPENDIX TO ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE STATE
OF THE FINANCES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1975,
at 54 (Table I) (1976).
Gi=.a + OiYi+ 02 Xli+ 63X2i+ lyX3i+ Ai
where
G i = per capita grants-in-aid in the i th state.
Y i = per capita income in the i th state.
X 1i = Northeast dummy variable (X i i = 1 if the i th state is in the North-
east, = 0 otherwise).
X 2i = South dummy variable.
X 3 i = West dummy variable.
i - Random error term.
CONSTANT INCOME NORTHEAST SOUTH 
WEST R 2
Coefficient 333.05 -. 02052 42.74 -2.55 50.01 .29
(T-statistics) (6.12) (2.26) (2.37) (0.15) (2.98)
The F-statistic for the set of dummy variables is 5.27 (3, 44).
1 71 The estimated regression was of the form:
Gi = a + iTi + #2Xli+ 0 3 X2i+ ByX
3 i+ ' i
The University of Chicago Law Review
The results show that regional effects are roughly as important
as redistribution effects in modifying the return flow of money to the
states from what it would be if grants-in-aid simply transferred
money to the states in proportion to personal income, or to federal
personal tax collections within each state. The sunbelt hypothesis,
however, provides a simplistic and essentially misleading explana-
tion of the regional effects of the grants-in-aid process.
Table I assumes that a neutral grants-in-aid program, involving
neither redistribution nor regional effects, would return funds to the
states in direct proportion to personal income within the state. In
order to give some dimension to the results, it should be borne in
mind that for 1975, the year studied, average per capita grants-in-
aid for the country as a whole were about $238. 72 Because of the
redistribution effect, the Northeast and the Midwest, the two re-
gions with the highest personal incomes, received about $21 and $18
per capita less than the national average, the West received about
$8 less, and the South, the region with the lowest per capita income,
recieved about $31 per capita more. Regional effects were not, how-
ever, consistent with the sunbelt hypothesis. Rather than the North-
east and the Midwest tending to support the South and the West,
the grant-in-aid process resulted in the South and the Midwest
tending to support the Northeast and the West.
The regional effect favoring the Northeast more than offset the
unfavorable redistribution effect there so that the Northeast, the
region with the highest per capita income, actually gained a net
benefit of about $3 per person. On the other hand, for the Midwest
where
G i, X 1i , X 2i , X 3i , p.° are defined as in Table I.
T i = per capita personal federal tax receipts in the i th state.
(Since personal federal tax receipts are not reported separately for Maryland and the District
of Columbia, the Maryland per capita tax figure was estimated by multiplying the combined
area receipts by that fraction of the area population residing in Maryland, then dividing by
the Maryland population.)
TAX
CONSTANT RECEIPTS NORTHEAST SOUTH WEST R2
Coefficient 261.49 .04647 42.00 1.04 46.08 .30
(T-statistic) (11.4) (2.45) (2.35) (0.06) (2.74)
The F-statistic for the set of dummy variables is 4.63 (3, 44).
172 This figure represents the average of state per capita receipts and therefore may
differ slightly from a national average arrived at by dividing total grants-in-aid by the total
U.S. population. More generally, the results of the regression treat each state as one unit
rather than weighting states by population.
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(the second highest income region), the regional effect reinforced the
redistribution effect so that the Midwest lost a total of about $37
per capita. The South, the region with the lowest per capita income,
lost nearly as much by the regional effect as it gained by the redistri-
bution effect and enjoyed a net benefit of about $9 per capita. The
West gained more per capita than any other region from the regional
effect (about $31 per capita) and had a net gain of about $23 per
capita.
Federal per capita personal tax collections are used in Table II
as an alternate measure of the redistribution effect to determine
whether federal tax revenues are redistributed through the grants-
in-aid process. The results of using this measure"' differ from those
derived from using per capita income principally as a consequence
of two factors. The federal income tax is progressive, 74 and hence
Table II shows a greater redistribution from the richer (Northeast-
ern and Midwestern) states to the poorer (Southern) states. A sec-
ond and rather odd effect stems from the fact that the Western
states pay somewhat less in federal personal taxes than one would
predict from their per capita income. By one method of calculation,
the states in the West pay about $104 less per capita than they
would pay if they were randomly located among the regions, taking
into account the interaction of the West's higher per capita income
and the progressivity of the federal personal income tax. 7 5 The
173 Federal personal tax collections (including both the personal income tax and employ-
ment taxes) were chosen rather than total federal tax collections because of concern about
the methods used to allocate corporate income tax collections among the states in the statisti-
cal compilations. Using personal taxes also excludes federal excise taxes, which are reported
by the location of manufacture. Kentucky, for example, accounts for a disproportionate share
of total excise tax collections because of its key position in the manufacture of bourbon
whiskey, though the incidence of the tax is more likely to be borne in the consuming states.
"I Employment taxes, which are included in total personal tax collections, tend on the
other hand to be proportional or even slightly regressive because the Social Security tax is
levied as a fixed percentage of wages up to a maximum wage base.
"I5 This result was obtained by comparing the per capita personal federal tax with the
per capita income of each state and the inclusion of a dummy variable for states in the West
in the estimation of a regression of the form:
Ti= -a + - 1 Yi--- #2Xi +Pi1
where
T i per capita personal federal tax in the i th state.
Y i = per capita income in the i th state.
Xj = West dummy variable (X i = 1 if i is a western state).
=4 Random error term.
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West, paying less than average in taxes, therefore gains through the
redistribution effect by about $10 per capita.' 71
The regional effect obtained by using federal tax collections is
slightly different from the regional effect measured by per capita
income because of the different method of calculating the redistri-
bution effect, but the regional effect in Table II remains roughly of
the same magnitude as in Table I. Again, the Northeast and the
West gain and the Midwest and the South lose. When redistribution
and regional effect are combined under the personal tax method of
calculation, the Northeast ends up a net loser by about $16 per
capita, the Midwest loses about $56 per capita, the South gains
about $25 per capita, and the West gains about $36 per capita. The
results under this method of calculation tend to confirm the sunbelt
hypothesis, but they also show that the West gains even more than
the South, and that the Midwest, rather than the Northeast, is the
big loser from the combined redistribution and regional effects.
However much weight may attach to the precise results of these
regressions,' 7  it is clear that the amount redistributed constitutes
only about one-tenth of the total amount transferred through grant-
in-aid programs, and that the redistribution effect is either offset or
reinforced by regional effects of somewhat the same magnitude."'
Even if redistribution from rich to poor can be said to be an implicit
function of the grant-in-aid system, it is not of great significance in
the total intergovernmental fiscal system. Certainly in comparison
with the West German system, where constitutionally mandated
CONSTANT INCOME WEST R 2
Coefficient -1102 .3676 -102.01 .68
(T-statistic) (5.26) (9.78) (1.59)
B 2 is significant at the .90 level.
"' Why the West pays less is by no means clear. If, for example, state tax collections
were higher per capita in the West, then federal personal income tax collections would be less
because of the deductibility for federal income tax purposes of certain state taxes. But there
are many other possible explanations.
" These rather simple regressions are concerned only with the overall effect of all grant-
in-aid programs and obviously do not deal with the details of the grants-in-aid system, which
is composed of a very large number of individual programs. See SPECIAL ANALYSES, supra note
7, at 280-87 .(Table 0-9) (listing of grant-in-aid programs).
,tS The redistribution and regional effects combined explain about 30% of the variance
in total grant-in-aid receipts of the states. The T-statistics indicate that the redistribution
effect is statistically significant. They also indicate that the regional effect is statistically
significant insofar as the Northwest and West gain and the Midwest and South lose. However,
it is not possible to state with confidence whether the Northwest or West is the larger gainer
or whether the Midwest or South is the larger loser.
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redistribution operates through revenue sharing between the Feder-
ation and the Linder and horizontal equalization among the
Ldnder, the American fiscal system remains a federal system in
practice and not merely in constitutional theory.
2. General Revenue Sharing. The introduction of general reve-
nue sharing in 1972 was an important development in intergovern-
mental fiscal relations. The name is something of a misnomer be-
cause revenues are not shared. The general revenue sharing program
is simply an expenditure program in which federal grants are made
each year to the states without the restrictions and conditions that
are the hallmark of conventional grants-in-aid. The 1972 State and
Local Fiscal Assistance Act' 9 provided for transfers averaging ap-
proximately $6 billion per year for five years (about 2% of federal
expenditures). This amount was increased to just under $7 billion
per year in the 45-month extension enacted in 1976.'1o
Although general revenue sharing is often referred to as a "no
strings" program, a number of conditions are in fact imposed on
recipient state and local governments. Not only may they not dis-
criminate on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, age, or
religion in the expenditure of the funds, 8' but they are subject to a
number of other conditions as well. For example, only prevailing
wage rates, which means union wage rates, may be paid on projects
financed with general revenue sharing funds.82 Until the 1976 exten-
sion, general revenue sharing funds could be used only for "priority
expenditures," a term defined to exclude welfare and general ad-
ministration.'8 But this requirement was abolished 84 when studies
showed that, because of the fungibility of money, recipient govern-
mental units had virtually total discretion to spend revenue sharing
funds as they liked, and could even use revenue sharing funds to
decrease local taxes. 85
1'' 31 U.S.C. § 1221-1263 (Supp. II 1972).
I" State and Local Financial Assistance Amendment of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-488, 90
Stat. 2341.
"1 15 U.S.C. § 1242 (1970), as amended by State and Local Financial Assistance Amend-
ments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-488, § 8, 90 Stat. 2341. In United States v. City of Chicago,
395 F. Supp. 329 (N.D. Ill. 1975), a federal judge enjoined payment of revenue sharing funds
to the City of Chicago because of discrimination in hiring in the police department. Cf. Lau
v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974) (sustaining § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (1970), which forbids discrimination by a program or activity receiving federal finan-
cial assistance).
,9 31 U.S.C. § 1243(a)(6) (Supp. II 1972).
"9 31 U.S.C. § 1222 (Supp. II 1972).
'" State and Local Financial Assistance Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-488, § 3,
90 Stat. 2341.
,u See ADViSORY COMMSSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, GENERAL REVENUE SHAR-
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The allocation of revenue sharing funds among states and
among subsidiary governmental units within states was a major
issue in the design of general revenue sharing. The resulting formula
reflects a series of political compromises rather than any identifia-
ble theory. Indeed, since the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives were unable to agree upon a formula, each state (taken as a
whole including its subsidiary units) is allotted the greater of two
amounts, namely, what it would receive under the Senate formula
or what it would receive under the House formula. This power to
choose the more favorable formula is aptly called the "best of both
worlds" approach.
Under the Senate formula allocation among states is made on
the basis of population, relative per capita income, and "tax ef-
fort." '8 The House formula includes, in addition to these three fac-
tors, "urbanized" population and state income tax collections. 8 ,
The House formula is thus more favorable to urban states and to
states that rely more heavily on income tax relative to sales, prop-
erty, and other taxes.
The practice of making federal grants directly to municipalities
or other local government units predated general revenue sharing.
But the potential of this practice for fragmenting state control of
local government and for undermining the political position of state
governors had previously been masked because grants-in-aid largely
supplemented existing state and local funding of specific ongoing
programs. Since general revenue sharing funds were by definition
not limited to any particular activity and therefore could be used
to fund new programs, the design of the sharing formula exacer-
bated the underlying rivalry among state governors, city mayors,
and county executives. This rivalry was at least as large a factor in
the legislative outcome as that among the states.
Once a state allocation is determined, one-third of that sum
goes to the state government and two-thirds directly to local govern-
ments within the state. The allocation among local governments is
controlled by a further formula. As a consequence, some 38,000
different governmental units receive revenue sharing checks from
the U.S. Treasury. The constitutional principle that the structure
ING: AN ACIR RE-EVALUATION 2, 11 (1974); CoimroLLm.R GENERAL, REVENUE SHARING: ITS USES
BY AND IMPACT ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTs 20-58 (1974).
'- 31 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (Supp. H 1972). The "tax effort" factor for each state is a
fraction equal to total revenue from state and local taxes divided by aggregate personal
income of residents. 31 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(1)(A) (Supp. II 1972).
19 31 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(3) (Supp. H 1972).
[44:271
American Fiscal Constitution
of local governments is strictly a question for each state is under-
scored by the wide differences in distribution patterns from state to
state. Among the 38,000 recipient local units are found a wide vari-
ety of local government forms-counties, municipalities, townships,
native villages (in Alaska), and Indian tribes. Four-fifths of the
recipient units have fewer than 2,500 residents. The smallest recipi-
ent is the Cortina Rancheria Indian Tribe in California with a popu-
lation of one.'18
The "best of both worlds" approach creates incentives and ef-
fects that are difficult to measure. One thing is clear however: gen-
eral revenue sharing provides no systematic equalization of revenues
between poorer and richer states. Of the five factors found in the
Senate and House formulas, only one-relative income-serves a
redistributional function. The urbanization factor, though arguably
a measure of need, operates in the opposite direction because the
urban states are by and large the states with the highest per capita
income.
Taking the program as a whole, however, general revenue shar-
ing does not have the potentially perverse redistributional effects
that characterize particular grant-in-aid programs. In general, the
states with the lowest per capita income receive the largest amount
of revenue sharing payments per capita. For example, the poorest
state, Mississippi, has received the largest amount of shared reve-
nue per capita, 153% of national average per capita receipts. Simi-
larly, the state with the highest per capita income, Connecticut, has
received the fourth smallest amount of shared revenue per capita.
On the other hand, the results reveal some remarkable discrepan-
cies. The second lowest per capita amount, for example, was re-
ceived by Missouri, the median state in per capita income. Simi-
larly, Alabama, fourth from the poorest state, has received almost
exactly the national average amount in per capita payments.'8
Whatever the results, it is clear that redistribution as such was
not a major goal of the Congress. Moreover, even if redistribution
had been the principal criterion, there are many ways to measure
redistribution. The comparisons above, for example, do not consider
what would happen in the absence of general revenue sharing (lower
federal taxes, higher grants-in-aid, a lower federal deficit, etc.). In
,14 FRIED, RIVLN, SCHULTZE & TETrERS, SETTING NATIONAL PRIORmTIEs: THE 1974 BUDGET
280 (1973).
' These comparisons are based on R. NATHAN, A. MANVEL & S. CALKiNs, MoNrrOuNG
REVENUE SHARING 72 (Table 4-3) (1975); REISCHAUER, GENERAL REVENUE SHARING: THE
PROGRAM'S INCENTIS 44-45 (Table 2) (1976) (Brookings Institution Reprint No. 313.)
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any event, so long as general revenue sharing remains such a small
percentage of state revenue-currently about 3%-any redistribu-
tional effect will be minor.
General revenue sharing at present levels could never by itself
result in "a reasonable equalization between financially strong and
financially weak states," as foreseen by Article 107(2) of the German
Basic Law. 10 The discrepancies in per capita personal income
among the states are simply too great. Per capita personal income
is over 60% higher in Connecticut than in Mississippi. Even between
contiguous states one finds remarkable differences; for example, per
capita personal income is more than 40% higher in Illinois than in
Kentucky.19 ' I have chosen per capita personal income as a measure
of what equalization would require because it is a measure of pro-
pensity and ability to spend and to tax. But if one looks at actual
spending and taxing, one finds equally extraordinary disparities
among the states. For example, state and local governments in Del-
aware and Wyoming spend more than twice as much per capita than
in Arkansas. '92 Moreover, tastes for self-taxation vary widely. Take
the case of Wyoming and Texas. Per capita income was about the
same in both in 1974. Yet it would have required about $2 billion
per year to bring Texas up to the Wyoming per capita state and local
expenditure level, nearly one-third of the entire general revenue
sharing budget.9 3 However one wants to measure equality, the pres-
ent general revenue sharing program would have to be many times
larger to make significant headway toward equalization even if the
richer states did not receive a penny.
With the 1976 reenactment of general revenue sharing, its fu-
ture as a permanent feature of American federalism seems assured.
Hence, it deserves to be considered as a feature of the Fiscal Consti-
tution in the larger sense. Although the general revenue sharing
statute does not create procedures for the resolution of important
fiscal decisions as do the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 and
the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,
it will most likely become a fixed pole around which both federal
and state budgeting will take place. But there is no likelihood that
general revenue sharing will displace grants-in-aid. On the contrary,
90 See text and notes at notes 129-30 supra.
,' BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GOVERNMENTAL FINANCES IN 1973-74, at 54 (Table 26)(1975).
192 Id. at 48 (Table 22).
"I Wyoming per capita personal income was $4,695 in 1974, slightly larger than the Texas
figure of $4,571. Wyoming spends $478 per capita, Texas $313. The $2 billion differential
results from the fact that Texas has a much larger population than Wyoming. Texas has more
than 12 million residents, Wyoming 360,000. Id. at 48, 54 (Tables 22, 26).
[44:271
American Fiscal Constitution
grants-in-aid are increasing at a much more rapid rate than general
revenue sharing. In fiscal 1978 general revenue sharing will be at a
level only about 10% higher than in 1973,194 but during that same
period grants-in-aid will have grown by about 65%.'11
3. Categorical and Block Grants. The greatest controversy in
the intergovernmental transfer field is the debate over categorical
versus block grants. Most grants-in-aid are categorical in character.
This means that any program's funds may be used by the recipient
state or local government only for a single narrow purpose. In addi-
tion, categorical grants normally have elaborate conditions attached
regulating the precise circumstances in which the funds may be
spent. Many categorical grants also require recipient governments
to match the federal funds out of their own revenues. During the late
1960s hundreds of such categorical grant programs were enacted.
Today state and local governments receive assistance through 928
categorical grant programs administered by 55 federal agencies,19
and the number of such programs will probably continue to grow.
A block grant, in contrast, consolidates a number of related
specific-purpose grants into a single grant with a more general pur-
pose. Within the scope of a block grant, state and local governments
are normally free to spend the money as they please. Exactly how
many block grant programs have thus far been enacted depends on
who does the counting. The Advisory Commission on Intergovern-
mental Relations has identified five such programs for the purposes
of its analytical work,' but their list includes the grants of the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), a Johnson Ad-
ministration initiative more accurately viewed as a new grant-
making agency designed to stimulate a quantum increase in funding
in a particular sector.'9 8
" Compare 1978 BUDGET, supra note 37, at 194, with BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT: FIscAL YEAR 1975, at 146 (1974).
,, SPECIAL ANALYSES 1978, supra note 7, at 273 (Table 0-5).
"' COMPTROLLER GENERAL, IMPROVED COOPERATION AND COORDINATION NEEDED AMONG ALL
LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT 1 (1975).
"I The Advisory Commission lists the following five statutes as creating block grants:
Partnerships for Health, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, the Comprehen-
sive Employment and Training Act, Title XX of the Financial Security Act, and the Com-
munity Development Block Grant portion of the Housing and Community Development Act
of 1974. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, BLOCK GRANTS: A ROUNDTABLE
DISCUSSION (1976).
"I See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, SAFE STREETS RECONSI-
DERED: THE BLOCK GRANT EXPERIENCE 1968-1975 (1977). An earlier Johnson Administration
initiative, the 1966 Partnerships for Health Act, also consolidated a series of categorical
programs, but again a principal motivation was a substantial increase in funding. See
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE PARTNERSHIPS FOR HEALTH ACT:
LESSONS FROM A PIONEERING BLOCK GRANT (1977).
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The most ambitious block grant proposals were the Nixon
Administration's special revenue sharing plans to consolidate about
one-third of all federal assistance to the states into six special reve-
nue sharing programs.199 The special revenue sharing proposals
proved to be anathema to the Congress, in part because they would
have disrupted the existing allocation of congressional committee
jurisdiction. Thereafter both the Nixon and the Ford Administra-
tions made block grant proposals on a more ad hoc basis. The only
block grants to result from that period are the 1973 Comprehensive
Employment and Training Act,"' consolidating 12 categorical man-
power programs, and the 1974 Housing and Community Develop-
ment Act,2 1 consolidating seven categorical community develop-
ment programs (of which the best known were Urban Renewal and
Model Cities) .202 The Carter Administration's views on block versus
categorical grants are as yet unknown. But if the Carter Administra-
tion, in line with its views on reorganization of the federal govern-
ment, should also attempt to consolidate various categorical grant-
in-aid programs, it is not at all clear that the Congress will be
prepared to go along.
The principal arguments for block grants are that (1) categori-
cal programs cause waste because the precise categories and condi-
tions are not always appropriate for the diverse situations to be
found in the states; and (2) categorical programs make it difficult
for governors and mayors to govern by relegating them to the status
of administrators of federal grant conditions and by restricting their
ability to reflect the preferences of their constituents in the alloca-
tion of resources. The leading arguments against block grants are
that (1) categorical grants do not in fact constrain recipient govern-
mental units in any significant way because money is fungible and
federal grants-in-aid remain only a fraction of total state and local
revenue; and (2) for a variety of political reasons transfers to state
and local governments-particularly to large cities-would be
smaller under a block grant than under a categorical grant ap-
proach. To meet the second argument part way, block grant propos-
"' OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,
FISCAL YEAR 1972, at 11-15 (1971).
29 U.S.C. §§ 801-992 (Supp. m1 1973).
2" 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5317 (Supp. IV 1974); see ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERN-
MENTAL RELATIONS: THE WORKING OF A FEDERAL-LOCAL BLOCK GRANT (1977).
2" The 1974 enactment of Title XX to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397-1397f
(Supp. IV 1974), providing grants to the states for social services has also been characterized
as a block grant program. See ADVISORY COMaISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, BLOCK
GRANTS: A ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION 6-9 (1976).
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als usually contain a "hold harmless" clause that provides that no
recipient unit would receive less under a block grant than it pre-
viously received from the total of the categorical programs to be
consolidated in the block grant. As suggested above, a political
objection to block grants in the Congress is that they would tend to
force a redefinition of the jurisdiction of congressional committees
and, by eliminating particular categorical programs, they might
even eliminate the raison d'etre of some specialized subcommittees.
D. Intergovernmental Planning
Taxing and spending together determine the budget surplus or
deficit of each level of government. Since the governmental surplus
or deficit is widely regarded as having a crucial impact on the econ-
omy, an important question for fiscal federalism is the extent to
which federal authorities will join together with state and local au-
thorities to plan an overall budgetary surplus or deficit."0 3 The al-
most total absence of intergovernmental planning in the United
States contrasts with the great interest in such planning in West
Germany. The Basic Law now commands multiyear intergovern-
mental planning,04 and an expert commission on constitutional re-
form has recommended a far-reaching expansion of such planning.0 5
Whether intergovernmental planning as it presently exists in
West Germany is of substantive importance or is merely cosmetic
may be questioned,0 6 but at least the desirability of such planning
is widely discussed. In the United States both the substance and the
discussion of intergovernmental planning are largely lacking. The
principal point of intergovernmental bureaucratic contact is be-
tween grant-making bureaus within the federal executive depart-
ments and state or local grant-administering agencies. But these
officials are concerned with the terms and conditions of the grants-
in-aid and the impact of these terms and conditions on state sub-
stantive programs, not with overall fiscal planning.
20 This is not to deny that there are significant differences between a surplus or deficit
at the federal level and a surplus or deficit at the state or local level. The most important
difference of course is that although all levels of government can borrow when they are in
deficit only the federal government can finance a deficit by printing money.
A GG arts. 106(3)(1), 109(3). It should be noted that intergovernmental planning in
West Germany extends beyond macroeconomics to expenditure planning in particular sec-
tors. See id. art. 91a(3).
ENQu9rE-KOMMISSION VERFASSUNGSREFORM, SCHLUSSBERICHT [ENQUkTE-COMM'N FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, FINAL REPORT], BUNDESTAGSDRUCKSACHE VII/5924, at 148-93 (1976).
1 Id. at 152; Baade, Mandatory Appropriations of Public Funds: A Comparative Study
(pt. 2), 60 VA. L. REv. 611, 650-54 (1974).
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Government documents, scholarly studies, and the media in
the United States devote great attention to the macroeconomic sig-
nificance of the deficit or surplus of the federal budget. In contrast,
the deficit or surplus of state and local governments is normally
ignored in these discussions. If state and local deficits are men-
tioned, they are considered not in terms of their macroeconomic
significance but in the context of the "need" for larger grants-in-aid
in functional areas where expenditures are growing rapidly (such as
welfare). Indeed, even where state and local governments have a
combined surplus, this fact is far less important in public discussion
than the "need" created by the deficit of certain state and local
governments.20
The currently perceived inadequacy of conventional macroe-
conomic theory to explain recent economic events may lead to
greater interest in state and local finances. But even if some form
of planning should emerge, recent experience indicates that it will
not take the form of encouraging state and local governments to
follow the lead of the federal government in running a deficit or
surplus. On the contrary, most of the recent attention in Congress
and the Treasury has been focused on the difficulties of those rela-
tively few states and municipalities (notably New York City) that
are near bankruptcy.2"'
Although intergovernmental planning as such is not a feature
of American federalism, limited steps have been taken to ensure
that federal programs are responsive to state and local needs and
preferences. After passage of the Intergovernmental Cooperation
Act of 1968,55 which called in general terms for improved coordina-
tion, the Office of Management and Budget issued Circular A-95.
The Circular requires the government agencies administering 138
federal programs deemed to have an impact on local communities
to notify various state and local institutions of proposed federal
Although one might gain the impression from the special pleading of state and local
governments appearing in the press that state and local governments generally run in the red,
state and local governments ran a collective surplus in 1972 and 1973 and again in the last
half of 1975. See 1976 JOINT ECONomic REPORT 102 (Table VII/1) (1976). One hears of deficits
but rarely of surpluses. Indeed, if state and local budgets were calculated on the same
"unified basis" the federal government uses, state and local governments ran a combined
surplus in every year of the 1970s. In a unified budget presentation, trust funds and general
funds are consolidated to reflect the effect of expenditures on the economy. Similarly, on a
national inpome accounts basis state and local governments have been in collective surplus
since 1968. ECONomIc REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 272 (Table B-73)(1977).
' See, e.g., New York City Seasonal Financing Act of 1975, 31 U.S.C. § 1501 (Supp. V
1975).
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 4231-4233 (1970).
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development projects and to permit them to comment on those
projects. In turn, local governments are required to notify state
governors and a regional "clearinghouse" before applying for federal
assistance so that other affected governments and organizations can
be made aware of any project that will have an adverse impact on
them and may file comments along with the application. The Circu-
lar A-95 process works well when all parties comply with its provi-
sions, but compliance appears to be spotty. Nevertheless, even if the
Circular A-95 process worked perfectly, it would still be an informa-
tion system rather than a planning system. 211
CONCLUSION
The past few years in the United States have seen a fundamen-
tal shift in public attitudes in fiscal matters. From the period in the
early 1960s when the principal problem appeared to be "fiscal drag"
(that is, the possibility that the tax system might produce more tax
revenues than would be spent and hence drag the economy into
recession), the United States has reached a period in the mid-1970s
where many, if not most Americans believe that there is no longer
any way of financing the basic needs of the country.
No doubt the truth lies somewhere between these extremes.
What is significant here, however, is that throughout the entire
1960-1977 period it has never been seriously suggested that the Con-
stitution stood in the way of desirable change. Indeed, one has to
go back to the period between the 1894 Pollock decision and the 1913
ratification of the sixteenth amendment to find public controversy
over the Fiscal Constitution."' When the need for fundamental
change has become widely recognized, change has taken the form
of "framework" legislation, most recently the Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.212
Meanwhile, fiscal federalism has continued to flourish. Even
when a crisis like that of New York City erupts, no one seriously
questions the future of American federalism. At most, it is assumed
that pragmatism will lead to ad hoc accommodations. To be sure,
the expansion of federal legislation and the federal budget causes
some pessimists to worry about the future of the states. But the
2I For further discussion of the Circular A-95 process, see COMPTROLLER GENERAL, IM-
PROVED COOPERATION AND COORDINATION AMONG ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT (1975); OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-95: WHAT IT Is, How IT WORKS (1974). The text of
Circular A-95 may be found at 38 Fed. Reg. 32874 (1973).
2" See text at note 82 supra.
212 31 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1407 (Supp. V 1975), discussed in text at notes 39-43 supra.
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growth of grants-in-aid offsets the growth of the federal establish-
ment. If the states have anything to fear, it is not that they will
dwindle in size relative to the federal government, but rather that
their freedom of action will be constrained by the terms and condi-
tions of grants-in-aid. Yet the success of general revenue sharing,
the interest in block grants, and recent Supreme Court decisions
such as National League of Cities v. Usery13 are straws in the wind
suggesting a renewed independence for the states.
Beneath the surface of change are the undeniable facts that
state and local governments spend about three-fourths as much as
the federal government,1 that they employ many times as many
people, that they continue to pursue widely different expenditure
policies in such basic areas as education and transportation, and
that there has been no serious attempt to equalize revenues among
the states. Whatever the state of health of federalism generally,
fiscal federalism is still very much alive.
213 426 U.S. 833 (1976), discussed in text at notes 39-43 supra.
114 See text and note at note 136 supra.
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